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Boosting housing supply in Australia and Canada: much more than planning de-regulation

‘The national project to make housing more affordable is focused entirely on increasing supply [and] … The plan for meeting the supply target is to change planning laws and allow more density in middle suburbs…’ So wrote revered Australian economic analyst, Alan Kohler in 2025.

Especially when it comes to the official narratives accompanying national housing policy in the 2020s, similar comments could be made for other countries including Canada and the UK, to name but two.

Even so, Kohler’s pithy summary underplays the diverse range of approaches that governments are nowadays deploying in their housing supply-focused efforts.

Moreover, while largely centred on planning reform and other ‘market enabling’ measures, initiatives in Canada and Australia now include direct commissioning and funding of housing construction on a scale without recent precedent.

To identify internationally adaptable approaches to boosting housing supply, our new study compared the post-pandemic housing market challenges and policy approaches of Canada and Australia, two of the world’s most comparable nations.

Structural factors

In both countries housing affordability challenges have come to the fore in policy and political debate since the 2010s, with rising house prices and rents generally outpacing incomes. Thus, Canada’s national house price-to-income ratio rose from under 4.0 in 2003 to 7.7 by 2022, with a similar increase observed in Australia.

At the same time, the nature of the housing supply challenge in the early 2020s contrasts significantly across the two countries. Most notably, trends in apartment construction have markedly diverged. By 2024, such building starts had fallen by 48% from their 2016 peak in Australia, whereas Canadian unit commencements had surged by 71% over this period.

The main explanation for this contrast appears to be the revived vitality of Canada’s purpose-built rental (PBR) apartment industry in the post-Great Financial Crisis era. This is a sector far more strongly represented here than in Australia. Canada’s PBR construction surged more than threefold in the decade to 2024, representing a remarkable 42% of all housebuilding by that date.

As shown by the Canadian PBR industry’s relatively stable output in the immediate post-pandemic era, this speaks to the product’s resilience in the face of challenging market conditions. While abetted by favourable lending and mortgage insurance policies, the main explanation is probably the over-riding priority PBR investors place on long-term rental returns. This leaves them relatively sanguine about short-term market conditions and prospects.

Encouraging planning liberalisation

Efforts to both liberalise land-use zoning restrictions and streamline development approval processes are indeed central to contemporary pro-housing supply efforts in the two countries. However, federal administrations are constitutionally constrained here. Lacking powers to mandate planning policy (controlled by state/territory/local governments), federal influence must be transmitted indirectly.

In Australia this has been recently progressed under the Albanese government via the 2022 National Housing Accord. Central to this inter-governmental agreement was the commitment by signatory federal, state/territory and local authorities to ‘[i]mproving zoning, planning and land release’.

Accord participants also endorsed a national housebuilding goal to construct 1 million new dwellings 2024-29, later upped to 1.2 million homes within that timeframe. The federal government pledged a $AUD3B ‘New Home Bonus’ payable to state/territory governments conditional on achievement of jurisdiction-specific building targets.

Parallel Canadian efforts have centred on the federal Housing Accelerator Fund (HAF), a $CAN4B program to incentivise planning and other relevant reform by local governments. More subtly, HAF payments are intended to support municipalities growing housing supply ‘faster than [the local] historical average’.

As operationalised since 2023, Canada’s HAF program has involved federal-municipal agreements where, in exchange for pledged federal payments, lower tier governments have committed to specific planning reforms and other undertakings to expand housebuilding.

Beyond their status as ‘reward payments’ for relaxing or simplifying land use planning’, Canadian HAF subsidies fund other municipality actions on housing supply. This includes local commitments to channel such funds into affordable housing construction.

Other pro-supply measures

As unpacked in our research, though, pro-housing supply measures in both countries extend well beyond planning liberalisation. As represented to some degree in both Canada and Australia, these include:

  • Infrastructure funding support
  • Low-cost debt facilities and development de-risking
  • Federal property tax reform
  • Workforce capacity building
  • Technological development
  • Government-funded housing production
  • Identifying and allocating public land for affordable non-market development.

Generally, these interventions have been disproportionately larger and more ambitious in the Canadian case – especially when it comes to de-risking private housing development, and in financial support pledged for pre-fabricated (or ‘modular’) housing construction.

But, while ‘market enabling’ measures remain dominant, recent initiatives have seen both countries also pledging muscular interventions in the commissioning and funding of housing for both sub-market rent and sale. The new Build Canada Homes agency launched by the Carney government is tasked with ‘[constructing] affordable housing at scale’ – including $CAN4B loans and $CAN6B contributions to [non-market] ‘deeply affordable housing, supportive housing, Indigenous housing, and shelters’.

Meanwhile the Australian Government pledged in 2025 to commission 100,000 homes for (ring-fenced) sale to first home buyers over eight years. This revives a practice which contributed significantly to expanding Australian home ownership under the Keynesian consensus of the early post-war period, although subsequently absent for half a century until now.

The modern pre-occupation with expanding housing production while doing little to dampen housing demand remains highly questionable. But the range of pro-supply initiatives proceeding in countries such as Canada and Australia is far broader than the dominant ‘planning deregulation’ narrative implies. These extend to measures that, in their interventionist nature, arguably challenge decades of neo-liberal orthodoxy.

Much like its Australian and Canadian counterparts, the Starmer government’s housing reform narrative has overstated the scope for easing housing affordability through planning reform.

Lessons for the UK

As in those comparator nations, UK governments need to shift away from over-reliance on blanket efforts to boost market supply through development approval deregulation. Instead, taking a leaf out of Canadian and Australian books, the promised national housing strategy for England should embrace a wider range of pro-supply initiatives.

Emulating recent boundary-pushing measures under Premiers Carney and Albanese these measures should include more direct interventions that recall an earlier post-war era when such actions were standard practice.

Hal Pawson is an Emeritus Professor at the University of New South Wales Sydney. Steve Pomeroy is an Industry Professor at McMaster University, Hamilton, Ontario.

A version of this article first appeared on Australia’s Fifth Estate site. 

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Why the construction sector needs social housing

With 169,000 children growing up in temporary accommodation – the highest number since records began – the case for the government’s manifesto commitment to ‘deliver the biggest increase in social and affordable housebuilding in a generation’ is overwhelming. This situation damages children’s health and development, and it is costing councils across England £7.7 million every day. It is a national scandal whose social and financial costs are well-understood.

But social housing does more than provide an alternative to poor-quality homes. It is also the foundation of a successful housebuilding system. Building social homes at scale – including during market downturns – can underpin the government’s response to the crisis in construction skills and innovation. Far from being in conflict, social housing and market housing can support each other.

The inherent limitations of the UK’s development model

In a housebuilding system which relies excessively on speculative market housing, developers compete against each other to pay the most for land. Having taken on a large upfront risk through high land costs, developers then need to recoup their investment, building as slowly as necessary to maintain prices. But when sales prices soften, even moderately, market housing starts plummet. Developers are not incentivised to start new schemes if they will have to sell homes for less than they assumed when buying land.

To make matters worse, in tandem with increasing dependence on this speculative model of market supply, the UK’s social housing supply model has become pro-cyclical. Post-war social housing developments were close to 100% social housing. Most costs were covered by grant, and land was assembled at low cost outside the speculative market. This model was insulated from market cycles, allowing the supply of social homes to continue during downturns in private housebuilding. In other words, social housing supply at this time was counter-cyclical.

From the 1980s, the dominant supply model for social housing flipped: grant rates were cut, borrowing costs rose, social landlords had to start competing with private developers in the land market. As a result, an expanded range of ‘affordable housing’ tenures (with costs pegged to market prices) has become increasingly dependent on cross-subsidy from the profits of building market housing. Far from smoothing out the boom and bust cycle of speculative private housebuilding, this model of building social housing intensifies those peaks and troughs. This doesn’t just affect how many homes are built. It shapes how the construction sector itself operates.

Supporting the UK’s construction sector

Ratcheting down: Private housing completions in England since 1946

Over repeated cycles of the housing market, the total output of speculative development is ratcheting downward. As housing starts plummet, so too does the demand for skills and materials. Many construction workers simply leave the sector, often permanently. It is no coincidence that construction workers are more likely to be self-employed than workers in any other sector. Today, more people are leaving the construction sector than joining it, and productivity has remained stubbornly flat for decades. Why would housebuilders maintain a large permanent workforce, or invest in the skills of that workforce, when they know they will need to retrench supply as the market turns?

Because firms cannot predict demand, materials prices have become more volatile. Official statistics show sharp swings in construction output and brick deliveries, worsening shortages and price spikes in an import-dependent system. As the construction industry has adapted to manage the risks of cyclical demand, construction capacity has atrophied.

The long-heralded shift to modern methods of construction (MMC) has also stalled. The speculative, stop-start nature of the industry makes the expense and risks of investment in innovation unattractive. Investors are reluctant to commit to factories which will be moth-balled at the first signs of the next housing market slowdown.

From stop-start to build, baby, build

A more balanced system would combine market housing with a counter-cyclical social housing programme, alongside new market models based on stable demand such as Build to Rent.

When governments fund and enable social housing at scale, it can be built as fast as need demands and construction capacity allows. As the Farmer Review of the UK Construction Labour Model found in 2016, a major programme of social housing would support predictability of demand for labour, skills and materials, resulting in a less risky operating environment for housebuilders, developers and planners. The booms and busts of cyclical market supply are smoothed out by counter-cyclical social supply, so capacity can be maintained and increased despite housing market cycles.

In countries such as Japan and Sweden, innovations and new technologies have thrived on this certainty, creating new opportunities to expand development capacity. It is no coincidence that the last time that modern methods of construction made a major contribution to overall housing supply in the UK was during the post-war social housing boom.

Of course, the benefits of a more sustainable skills base and of innovation in construction today would be felt far beyond the developments which first enabled them. If social housing schemes keep construction workers in the sector during market downturns, those experienced workers will be available to the private sector when the market recovers. If social housing schemes provide enough stable demand to keep MMC providers in business, market housing will be able to benefit from their services, too. While construction capacity is often seen as a constraint on building more social housing, the reverse is also true. A stable pipeline of social housing would expand capacity, supporting more jobs, stronger skills, and greater innovation across the sector.

The government’s new Social and Affordable Homes Programme 2026-36 represents the most significant policy shift back towards a counter-cyclical social housing supply model in decades. A future blog will explore how this could work in practice, and what further changes are needed.

Would you like to write for Red Brick? Email rose.grayston@gmail.com to pitch your piece (c.600-900 words)

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A new generation of new towns in England

80 years after the Act which launched the post-war Labour government’s New Towns programme, the current government has set out its proposals for a new generation of New Towns. Between 1946 and 1970, 32 New Towns were designated in the UK (21 in England), generating homes for 2.8 million people. It was the most ambitious urban development programme ever undertaken by a UK government and was a key element in that government’s plans for tackling the acute housing problems it faced following six years of war and all the damage that had resulted.

Although the economic and housing problems facing the UK today differ in a number of respects from those of 1946, they are no less acute and call for bold and radical responses. Recognising that a New Towns programme could make a very significant contribution to resolving today’s challenges, the government decided, soon after coming into office in July 2024, to set up a Taskforce, chaired by Sir Michael Lyons, to recommend a new generation of New Towns. This week’s announcement is the government’s response to the Taskforce recommendations. The Taskforce report covered four main themes;

  1. The rationale for a New Towns programme
  2. The placemaking principles which should underpin the programme
  3.  Proposed New Town locations
  4.  The necessary delivery mechanisms and arrangements. 

There are strong economic as well as housing justifications for developing New Towns. Shortages of suitable and affordable homes constrain growth in many areas. Tackling the undersupply of homes requires a step change in output, which in turn depends on maximising the contribution of all potential providers, across both public and private sectors. A programme of planned developments at scale, comprising a variety of homes to meet the full range of needs, supported by necessary infrastructure, provides a real opportunity to accelerate the anaemic rates of housebuilding which have characterised recent years. It is no co-incidence that we have as a country failed to deliver over 250,000 homes a year since the 1980s when the earlier New Towns programme was wound down, along with the council housebuilding programme, by the Thatcher government.

If expanding the number of homes we build is an important objective, just as important is raising the quality of our new homes and their environment.  With this in mind, the Taskforce recommended a set of placemaking principles which should underpin the New Town programme. These are vital to ensure that the New Towns created under the new programme are exemplary places in which people will want to live, and in which they can feel proud and at home. The aim must be to create strong communities with the necessary facilities, social and physical infrastructure, attractive parks and green spaces, designed to meet sustainability and biodiversity objectives and to encourage healthy lifestyles.

The Taskforce proposed 12 locations, each suitable for developments of at least 10,000 homes, and with the potential to deliver between 250,000 and 300,000 homes. The government has given the go-ahead to seven of the recommended sites, with a combined potential for a little under 200,000 new homes. While this goes a substantial way towards the Taskforce aspirations, it does change the geographic spread, leaving a programme heavily focussed on London and the South East (Thamesmead and Enfield in London, Tempsford near Bedford and Milton Keynes), with two northern cities (Leeds and Manchester) and Bristol as the only outliers.

More peripheral sites proposed by the Taskforce (Marlcombe near Exeter, Plymouth, Heyford Park in Oxfordshire, Wychavon Town in Worcestershire and Adlington in Cheshire) are not being taken forward.  They are expected to receive support from government under other programmes, but their exclusion from the New Towns programme risks undermining its credibility as a national initiative. There is also the question of potential future sites elsewhere, which could potentially be added to the programme, as happened successfully in the 1950s and 1960s. This option should in my view be kept open, not least to ensure that the country takes the most benefit from the experience gained by the trailblazers.

The Taskforce made a series of recommendations on delivery mechanisms and arrangements which need to be put in place to enable the New Town programme to be progressed to best effect and most cost-effectively. The establishment of single-minded Development Corporations to oversee the planning and growth of each New Town, and the early public acquisition of land to enable the Development Corporations to control the pace and nature of the development in line with its approved Masterplan, are among the most important issues to be resolved. The foundations for a New Towns programme are now clearly in place and the government’s commitment this week to take it forward is very much to be welcomed. The challenge now is to ensure successful implementation.   

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Delivering 1.5m new homes: setting up new development corporations – a blueprint for success

Introduction

The government is taking decisive action to address the housing crisis by proposing new development corporations to act as master developers. This initiative supports the ambition to deliver 1.5 million new homes. To aid this, the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government (MHCLG) has established the New Towns Taskforce, an independent expert panel.

The New Towns Taskforce report, published in September 2025, identified 12 potential new towns and proposed delivery via development corporations. The report argues that development corporations are the most suitable delivery vehicle, recommending they have Planning Authority powers.

Temsford in Bedfordshire is considered a promising first site, partly due to its proximity to existing and planned rail routes.

The House of Lords Built Environment Committee’s report, New Towns: Laying the Foundations, published in October 2025, includes a chapter on governance and stewardship of development corporations. It states: “Development Corporations should be the default governance and delivery structure for new towns and expanded settlements and should be used in all but exceptional cases.”

The Institute for Government’s Devolution and Regeneration Report, published in December 2024, outlines the case for mayoral development corporations, reviewing their history, operating models, and governance mechanics.

Currently, only a few mayoral development corporations exist, with the London Legacy Development Corporation serving as a successful example. More are expected as devolution expands.

Fundamentals for Establishing a Modern Development Corporation

To ensure these urban development vehicles exemplify best practice, they must be founded on clear principles. Having recently helped establish a circa 400,000 home multi-site development corporation outside of the UK, I outline twelve key fundamentals as a blueprint for success:

  1. Vision and Mission
    A development corporation must define a compelling vision and mission, including targets for social, affordable, and market housing. This vision should reflect local aspirations and support regional economic growth, providing diverse housing types and tenures.
  2. Market Analysis and Feasibility
    Comprehensive market research should assess demand across residential, commercial, civic, and mixed use assets. Feasibility studies must evaluate financial, environmental, and social viability, ensuring sites align with infrastructure and gain local support. Job creation, business growth, and transport connectivity must also be considered.
  3. Regulatory Context
    Understanding statutory powers and planning frameworks is essential. This includes aligning with recent planning reforms and clarifying how planning control is exercised, especially if within the corporation’s remit.
  4. Financial Strategy
    Detailed budgeting should underpin each phase. Funding from public-private partnerships, grants, loans, and private capital must be secured, with robust financial oversight. Strategic use of public funds for infrastructure, particularly brownfield, transport, utilities, and public services, should be paired with land acquisition and value capture to reduce long term reliance on government funding.
  5. Project Delivery and Management
    Professional development, urban planning, and project management are crucial. Dedicated teams should prepare master plans, while a Project Management Office (PMO) oversees implementation, ensuring deadlines, quality, and budgets are met. Design standards ensure consistent, high quality development.
  6. Skills and Capacity
    To become an employer of choice, corporations must invest in a skilled workforce supported by external consultants and engage delivery partners through robust capacity building strategies.
  7. Infrastructure Planning
    Planning should align with the government’s long-term infrastructure strategy, covering transport, utilities, waste, water, and digital networks. Social infrastructure, including schools, healthcare, community spaces, and green amenities, should be delivered concurrently with or before housing to ensure liveable neighbourhoods.
  8. Community Engagement
    Transparent public engagement is critical. Regular consultation with residents, businesses, and stakeholders ensures the master plan meets local needs and priorities.
  9. Inter Authority Collaboration
    Strong partnerships with local authorities ensure alignment with local plans. Early engagement with transport, health, education, and utility bodies is vital. Long term stewardship models must be established to sustain services and infrastructure.
  10. Sustainability, Resilience, and Innovation
    Design and construction must support the UK’s net-zero goals. Plans should address climate resilience and economic adaptability. Modern Methods of Construction (MMC) and SMART technologies can accelerate delivery and enhance quality.
  11. Marketing and Identity
    A strong, values led brand positions the new town competitively. Marketing should attract residents and investors, showcasing the town’s offer and long term vision.
  12. Monitoring and Evaluation
    Success should be measured via clear Key Performance Indicators (KPIs). Master plans must remain adaptable based on monitoring, community feedback, and pilot initiatives such as new financing models or build to rent schemes.

A Blueprint for Success

Lessons from previous development corporations and recent mayoral development corporations can guide this new generation of development corporations. Milton Keynes Development Corporation, arguably the UK’s most successful urban development corporation, provides a well-documented example.

Milton Keynes was established in 1967 and dissolved in 1992 upon completing its mission. It had powers to compulsorily purchase 22,000 acres of farmland, acted as its own planning authority, and managed infrastructure and social amenities, including public housing.

In addition to the outlined fundamentals, lessons should also be drawn from Milton Keynes or other similarly completed new towns so that best practice can be developed and included in establishing new development corporations.

By following best practices from the UK’s strongest examples and adhering to the twelve core fundamentals, development corporations can support the government’s housing goals, delivering sustainable, inclusive communities while raising standards for future urban development across the UK.

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Standardising Section 106 agreements is overdue. Making it stick will be harder.

Anyone involved in housing delivery knows that negotiating and agreeing Section 106 has become one of the biggest drags on the system. It’s not because planning obligations are wrong in principle. Quite the opposite. Done well, they secure affordable housing, infrastructure and mitigation that make development acceptable and sustainable. The problem is the process.

I was pleased to host the recent launch of the Land, Planning and Development Federation’s work with Town Legal and Lord Banner KC on simplifying and standardising Section 106 agreements. Their report sets out a compelling case for reform, backed by hard evidence on delays. Data from the Home Builders’ Federation shows that average S106 timelines are now stretching well beyond a year, with some agreements taking several years to conclude. That’s time when homes that already have a resolution to approve are simply not being built.

There is a straightforward and sensible solution to addressing this delay. Introduce a national template for small and medium-sized schemes, reduce the endless re-drafting of boilerplate clauses and focus negotiations on what actually matters on a site; the local context and local need. A national template will deliver faster decisions and result in lower legal costs, improving viability, and removing friction from the process. For SME builders in particular, these delays can be the difference between a viable scheme and one that never gets delivered.

But we should be clear-eyed. Standardisation alone will not fix the problem.

I have seen first-hand how even well-designed standard documents can get picked apart in practice. We have been here before in the construction sector. NEC contracts were meant to simplify delivery and drive collaboration. PAS 91 was designed to streamline pre-qualification for public schemes. In both cases, lawyers across the system found ways to add caveats, amendments and bespoke wording until the standard became anything but.

There is no reason to think Section 106 will be immune from the same behaviour.

That is why Government has a critical role to play if this reform is to land properly. Guidance matters. The National Planning Policy Framework and Planning Practice Guidance needs to go further than warm words about engagement and efficiency. They should actively promote the use of standardised Section 106 templates, set clear expectations that deviation from agreed boilerplate should be the exception not the rule, and require local planning authorities to justify where and why they depart from national templates.

Centralising this element of planning will not strip councils of discretion. Local variation will always be needed and possible. But predictability, proportionality and pace are essential if we are serious about the delivery of 1.5 million homes. A standard starting point, backed by firm national guidance, gives councillors confidence, reduces risk for developers, and helps officers manage stretched workloads.

If our Secretary of State Steve Reed MP, and Housing Minister Matthew Pennycook MP are serious about building more homes, which I believe they are, especially through SME builders, then fixing the Section 106 process is essential. Simplifying and standardising is the right direction of travel. But without Government being explicit, consistent and firm in policy and guidance, the system will default back to complexity.

The opportunity is there. We should take it, and make sure it sticks.

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Labour’s Commonhold Bill is the start of the end of the leasehold nightmare

Last week Labour published its Leasehold and Commonhold Reform Bill. It is an unquestionable triumph. Ground rents are capped at £250, commonhold is reinvigorated as a realistic tenure, and issues around forfeiture are put to rest.

Most importantly, it sets out a new mechanism for leaseholders to convert to commonhold without the previous requirement to have unanimity between all residents. 

This week is the start to the end of this nightmare, but it is a complex route. It will be up to leaseholders to transition buildings over to commonhold one-at-a-time, and this will be easier on some sites than others.

The Government has also clearly set out a different strategy for reform than their Conservative predecessor. While the Tories set out most of their reforms in two pieces of legislation, the Ground Rent Act (2022) and the Leasehold and Freehold Reform Act (2024), Labour’s programme is running on bespoke tracks, with varied primary and secondary legislation to address the wide variety of issues within leasehold.

So, taking a step back, what is Labour doing to end the leasehold nightmare and what will these changes mean for residents?

What is Commonhold? And how does Labour’s Bill change it?

Currently, most flat owners in the UK are leaseholders. They own everything within the walls of their home, but the overall site is owned by a ‘freeholder’, usually a larger company like a developer or a pension fund. This freeholder is responsible for shared communal areas, and the overall building.

Freeholders can appoint whatever organisation they want to manage the building (a ‘managing agent’), who often charge high fees while delivering a poor service. And freeholders themselves are often unresponsive and fail to act proactively to respond to leaseholders’ needs.

Commonhold is an alternative model introduced by Labour in 2002. Homeowners collectively own the whole site, and decide on things like which managing agents to appoint collectively.

However, a number of issues with commonhold mean that it was not widely adapted. It requires the consent of all leaseholders and their mortgage lenders, and there are a number of governance issues with commonhold that make it difficult for homeowners to manage buildings effectively.

Finally, without any incentive to build commonhold sites, developers have almost never done this, and instead can either keep the freehold to take some income themselves, or sell this off to another organisation.

Labour’s Bill fixes commonhold in three key ways:

  1. It bans all new leasehold flats except in exceptional circumstances, on which the Government is consulting currently.
  2. It introduces a new mechanism by which leaseholders can convert to commonhold with 50% of leaseholders consenting (or with unanimity if less than 50% of residents are ‘qualifying leaseholders’, such as in shared ownership blocks or where a freeholder lets out flats within a block).
  3. It has a wide array of fixes to commonhold which sort out its governance issues, from helping to appoint directors, to regulating dispute resolution and ensuring more responsible governance.

This will allow substantially more blocks across the UK to convert to commonhold, as thousands of sites have already reached the 50% threshold for other mechanisms within leasehold, such as collective enfranchisement and obtaining the Right to Manage.

What else is Labour doing on leasehold?

Within the Bill there is a lot more to be excited about. The ground rent cap will lower costs for nearly a million leaseholders paying over the £250 level, as well as eliminating the issue of homeowners being unable to sell properties with escalating ground rents. The new framework for forfeiture will prevent freeholders from being able to repossess homes for minor breaches of contracts or debts as low as £350.

The Housing Minister Matthew Pennycook also confirmed further primary legislation to make it easier for leaseholders to renew or ‘buy out’ their lease through reforms to the process of setting valuation rates.

And, outside of the Bill, Labour is acting to fix leasehold.

In order to tackle escalating service charges, new regulations are pending which will see a new regulatory regime for managing agents, increased transparency and scrutiny of costly major works, and a ‘right to veto’ managing agents which will make it easier for leaseholders to both request a change of managing agent and to decline a freeholder’s suggestion.

And a response is also pending to a consultation held over the winter period for freehold owners paying service charges on unadopted communal infrastructure (otherwise known as ‘fleecehold’).

After this – what will the challenges be?

Three main challenges exist for the Government less in enacting this reform.

First are the courts, the major residential freeholders are famously litigious and have already successfully held up delays to leasehold reform over the past year through launching a judicial review. While the appetite for further action is uncertain, the risk is present for freeholders to attempt this again, particularly over measures retroactively capping ground rent and overriding existing leases.

Second will be ensuring a smooth transition for the leaseholders who do want to move to commonhold. Getting rid of often distant, unresponsive and exploitative freeholder will be a huge improvement in the lives of millions of leaseholders. But shifting to making complex decisions about building management and safety in partnership with your neighbours also has difficulties. Reems of advice and support will be needed for new commonholders, particularly in blocks which do not have a long history of collective enfranchisement.

And finally will be what remains for the leaseholders who cannot convert. Even the reinvigorated commonhold, shared ownership will still be a separate permitted lease, and many blocks struggle to reach the threshold of 50% support for changes such as the Right to Manage because a large portion of the block are buy-to-let landlords. The Government does have an extensive reform programme to make leasehold fairer for these cohorts, but it will be worth monitoring the conversion process to see what more can be done for them.

Labour’s Commonhold Bill is the biggest change to housing law in years, and fundamentally challenges the concept of land and housing as an asset which underpins much of our problematic housing system. Such a bold change will require political will and expert attention to get right, and it is up to all of us in the Labour movement to get it over the line.

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Delivering 1.5 million homes: transforming the vision into reality with a Target Operating Model

What is a Target Operating Model and Why is it Needed

A Target Operating Model (TOM) is a comprehensive strategic framework designed to align an organisation’s structure, functions, and processes with its overarching vision and mission. It serves as a blueprint for organising resources, workflows, and capabilities in the most effective way to support long-term goals, operational excellence, and the delivery of value to stakeholders.

The Government’s New Towns Task Force’s report in September 2025 identified 12 potential New Towns and proposed these are delivered by Development Corporations. A Development Corporation charged with delivering a large-scale urban development should at the very onset put in place a robust TOM before commencing a delivery programme to ensure strategic cohesion, operational readiness, and delivery efficiency.

Key Benefits of Implementing a Target Operating Model:

In the context of large-scale urban development, particularly in homebuilding programmes that include infrastructure and community infrastructure a well-structured TOM delivers a wide range of benefits that directly contribute to the success and resilience of an urban development delivery body such as a Development Corporation by proving for:

  • Strategic Alignment: Provides vision and direction that aligns with long-term goals and investment plans.
  • Operational Efficiency: Maps out processes and procedures aligning development, planning, construction and asset management.
  • Enhanced Governance and Risk Management: Defines roles and responsibilities, compliance and risk management.
  • Better Stakeholder Management: Customer focused, improving delivery for residents, investors, and government partners with consistency of standards and transparency improving trust with public and private stakeholders.
  • Agility and Scalability: Responds to market shifts, supports growth and innovation.
  • Improved Financial Management: Implements cost control and creates investment ready opportunities.
  • Talent and Capability Optimisation: Building a workforce that is aligned with business needs, with skills development.

A Target Operating Model Framework for Urban Development

An effective Target Operating Model (TOM) for an urban development organisation comprises a set of integrated components that collectively guide delivery, performance, and long-term value creation.

1. Strategic Foundation

A strong strategic foundation anchors the TOM. The organisation must articulate a clear vision and mission focused on delivering mixed-use, well-serviced communities supported by high-quality infrastructure and amenities.

2. Core Operating Pillars

a) Business Capabilities
The organisation requires end-to-end capabilities across the development lifecycle, including planning, land acquisition, infrastructure delivery, design and construction management, procurement, marketing, and long-term asset stewardship. Effective community engagement, strategic partnerships, and sound financial structuring are also essential to creating sustainable, people-centred places.

b) Organisational Structure and Governance
A central leadership team typically sets strategic direction, oversees finances, and develops business cases, while regional or project-based units manage local delivery. A clear governance model supported by roles such as CEO, CFO, and Head of Development, along with investment, audit, and compliance committees enables accountable, timely decision making and transparent reporting.

c) Key Processes
The TOM should establish a structured development lifecycle, with stage gates from feasibility through approvals, design, construction, and post-completion operations. Supporting processes include investment appraisal, regulatory compliance, stakeholder reporting, and customer engagement.

d) Data and Digital Infrastructure
A modern TOM relies on strong digital architecture. Integrated systems including GIS, BIM, CRM, and project management platforms should feed into a centralised data environment. This enables real-time monitoring of project progress, financials, ESG metrics, and operational KPIs, supporting accurate forecasting and evidence based decision making.

e) People and Culture
Workforce strategy should blend a skilled core team with flexible, project-based resources and specialist third-party partners. The culture must champion innovation, inclusivity, and sustainability, reflected both in internal practices and in how communities are engaged.

f) Performance Management
Performance must be routinely monitored through metrics such as Internal Rate of Return (IRR), schedule and cost performance, ESG outcomes, and customer satisfaction. Monthly and quarterly reviews provide insights that enable course corrections and reinforce continuous improvement.

Target Operating Model Implementation Roadmap

A TOM will require an implementation Roadmap delivered in stages before its considered as being effected.

  • Current State Assessment: Conduct a diagnostic review of existing capabilities, systems, and workflows, supported by a gap analysis to identify areas for transformation.
  • Design of the Future-State Model: Develop a tailored TOM framework that reflects the unique context and objectives of the organisation, drawing from proven models where appropriate.
  • Stakeholder Alignment: Engage key internal and external stakeholders to validate the model and ensure their support through structured consultation and co-design.
  • Implementation Planning: Develop a detailed, phased rollout plan, potentially organised by function, geography, or project type. Pilot programmes may be used to test and refine the model before full deployment.
  • Monitoring and Continuous Improvement: Establish a feedback loop using KPIs, data analytics, and stakeholder insights to refine the TOM on an ongoing basis and embed lessons learned.

Conclusion

A well-designed Target Operating Model is essential for any urban development delivery body such as a Development Corporation seeking to deliver complex, long-term infrastructure and housing programmes effectively. It not only aligns people, processes, and systems with strategic intent but also fosters transparency, trust, and agility in delivery.

The House of Lords Built Environment Committee’s recent Report, ‘New Towns: Laying the Foundations’ published in October 2025 has a Chapter on Governance and Stewardship covering Development Corporations. The report sets out many recommendations to encourage success and establishing Development Corporations with robust TOM’s can greatly support this success.

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The Future of Home Buying: Can the government finally fix England’s broken housing transaction system?

After years of half-measures and failed initiatives, the government has again turned its gaze to one of Britain’s most frustrating institutions: the home buying process. It’s a system that is broadly recognised as broken – and one that successive governments have repeatedly promised, and failed, to fix.

The average home move now takes a staggering 205 days from listing to completion. One in three transactions collapses before completion, and £1.5 billion is lost each year through failed sales. These figures represent families stuck in limbo, renters unable to move, and buyers forced to reapply for mortgages as chains collapse around them.

This time, though, there are hopes across industry that the government appears serious. A  consultation on reforms to the system has been launched, and with cross-party consensus that the housing market’s inefficiency acts as a brake on growth, it marks the most significant modernisation attempt in decades. Whether it succeeds may depend less on political will and more on whether the government is ready to embrace the kind of digital innovation that transformed markets abroad.

A long road to reform

For years, the conveyancing process has been defined by paperwork, disconnected systems and inconsistent protocols. Each party – agents, lenders, conveyancers, surveyors, local authorities, and HM Land Registry – operates in its own digital silo, with limited interoperability. The result is predictable delays, duplication, and error embedded in almost every transaction, leaving Britain’s homes stuck as trapped liquidity in the housing market.

The consultation sets out an ambitious vision: a digitally enabled home buying and selling system with consistent use of upfront information, stronger regulation for estate agents, and better consumer protection. It also hints at exploring binding offers and AI-assisted conveyancing, though both remain long-term ambitions rather than immediate reforms.

Ministers argue that reform will “increase transparency, reduce fall-throughs, and improve trust”. It is language that feels familiar. In 2010, the last major reform attempt – the ill-fated Home Information Packs (HIPs) – collapsed under political pressure and technical confusion. Many in the industry fear history could repeat itself.

This time, there’s one crucial difference: the technology now exists to make reforms work.

Proven solutions from abroad?

Australia’s experience offers a compelling glimpse of what the UK could achieve. Over the past decade, the introduction of electronic conveyancing and a digital completion platform has transformed the buying process there.

PEXA is a digital property exchange platform that modernises the process of buying and selling property by allowing solicitors, conveyancers, and lenders to complete property transactions electronically, replacing traditional paper-based systems. Originating in Australia, its UK bespoke platform connects lenders and conveyancers in a secure shared digital environment, improving collaboration, automating financial settlement, and expediting title lodgement.

Through PEXA as the core infrastructure, all parties in a transaction – conveyancers, lenders, and land registries – can transfer funds securely, and validate and register title in real time.

The results are stark. The average settlement in Australia takes five weeks. [CD1] [LM2] [CD3] Settlement fraud has been virtually eliminated, requisitions (manual errors delaying registration) have fallen significantly, and there is consumer confidence in the process.

It is, in short, a working model of what a digital property market can deliver.

In the UK, PEXA has now built a platform specifically for the challenges of the UK market. NatWest is currently implementing PEXA with a view to transacting remortgage transactions by the end of the first half of 2026 and facilitating sale and purchase transactions down the line. The platform is the seventh regulated payment scheme in the Bank of England, and the first built specifically for property transactions. There is growing acknowledgement and excitement that secure, instantaneous completions are now possible on our shores too.

Whether government reforms can align with this kind of digital infrastructure remains uncertain. The consultation makes limited mention of payment and completion reform – a notable omission given that the key moment in a property transaction, when the money moves and title is transferred, remains the moment of greatest risk. Though measures like binding contracts might help prevent fall throughs, the government must ensure it focuses on fixing the act of buying and selling a home, the core transaction, not just the supporting processes.

The fraud problem

It’s a vulnerability that costs consumers and law firms dearly. Fraud is rising across the sector: 65% of law firms have faced cyber incidents and 30% of buyers have experienced property fraud, driven by payment diversion scams, bogus law practices and identity theft.

The structural problem is clear: money and title still move on separate tracks. Funds are manually transferred through generic banking rails, while title changes are lodged with HM Land Registry at some point after completion. In this gap – sometimes hours, sometimes days – the system is at its weakest.

A move towards centralised, regulated digital completion platforms, integrated directly with the banking system, would close that gap. It is a reform that goes beyond convenience; it’s a question of national financial security.

For now, though, fraud prevention appears only lightly referenced in the consultation – folded into broader ambitions around transparency and consumer protection. Many in the industry believe that’s a missed opportunity.

The politics of progress

With successive governments preoccupied with housing supply, conveyancing reform rarely tops the agenda. Yet 42% of buyers report mental health impacts from the stress of moving, and the workforce is under strain too: the number of lawyers practicing in conveyancing in England and Wales has fallen by 15% (from just over 13,000 in Sept 2021 to 11,140 in Jan 2025), reflecting burnout in a system burdened by outdated processes, extra administration, stress and delays.

The challenge, as ever, is sequencing. The financial transaction should sit at the centre of these reforms, not as an afterthought.

For the first time in years, there is genuine momentum. With digital infrastructure now being put in place, a coalition of reformers spanning government, fintech and conveyancing could finally deliver the modernisation that buyers and sellers have long been promised.

For a housing system long stuck in the 20th century, this consultation is a moment of truth.


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Labour’s shift to homelessness prevention is a crucial opportunity for councils

Homelessness has rapidly become a key challenge facing local authorities. Spending by councils in England on temporary accommodation has reached £2.8 billion a year, up from £1.7 billion a couple of years ago.

This is causing great harm. There were 132,410 households staying in temporary accommodation in June 2025 because they risked homelessness, a record high. Almost two thirds are families with children.

Evidence shows us that children who experience homelessness do less well at school, have poorer health and are more likely to be impacted by homelessness in adulthood.

Costs are soaring but outcomes are worse. The reason? Homelessness spending is heavily skewed towards responses once individuals and families reach crisis. Our system reacts rather than prevents. Our aim must be to drive this system towards prevention upstream.

There are challenges in embracing prevention. Many local authorities are losing their institutional memory of what effective homelessness prevention involves; things like tenancy sustainment, legal support, advice on debt. Resources and capacity have been sucked into crisis interventions.

We also lack evidence of which prevention programmes work and provide value for money. This requires experimentation, coupled with independent evaluation.

Investing in prevention requires an up-front cost. Councils have to meet current demand and fund preventative services whose benefits take longer to emerge.

That’s why it was significant that Rachel Reeves, in the Spending Review in June, allocated £100 million over the next two years specifically for homelessness prevention. Its purpose is to ‘prevent homelessness through investing in early intervention measures’. Most of the money will come from the Transformation Fund to support fundamental reform of public services, overseen by the Cabinet Office.

Ideally, this should endow a national fund for research and development of early prevention initiatives to create change at a system level. Without national scaffolding – shared data, common evaluation standards and support for implementation – we risk repeating the “pilot malaise” that has held back progress for a decade.  It appears, however, that the Government’s preference is to pass this additional funding to local areas.

If so, it is critical that this additional funding does not top up councils’ current day-to-day homelessness spending, which will be drawn inexorably towards reactive crisis responses. More of the same will produce the same bad outcomes.

Local authorities should use part of this money to adopt or test promising early interventions.

This will require leadership. Prevention work is often less visible than crisis services. Polling evidence shows public support stronger for tangible things like emergency shelters, hostels and refuges than for prevention activity, although this still has majority support. When asked what would make the greatest difference in reducing homelessness, between 82% and 84% say refuges, safe houses and emergency housing, while 56% say investing in prevention services.

It will also require support. Some councils have shown they can innovate: the London Borough of Barking and Dagenham, for instance, used data it holds on residents’ financial stress, such as council tax arrears, to offer them targeted support such as a debt repayment plan.

Such initiatives are very much the exception, however, not the rule. Councils vary enormously in capability. Expecting each to design, procure and evaluate interventions independently leads to duplication, slow progress and uneven quality.

And, for local authorities that do develop effective prevention approaches a big question remains about how this learning can be shared and scaled across the system.

This is where metro mayors and combined authorities can advance the devolution agenda by stepping up and leaning in to this homelessness prevention challenge. Combined authorities provide an appropriate scale for rigorous testing and shared learning: large enough for unified datasets and specialist expertise, small enough to stay rooted in place. They can take on the capabilities individual councils cannot realistically build alone – intervention design, behavioural science, predictive analytics, flow management, and evaluation methodology – and help ensure prevention becomes the norm, not the exception.

The rigorous evaluation and learning that determines what truly works must be coordinated. Combined authorities can ensure councils are not left to reinvent the wheel, and that learning can be generated once and shared many times. Councils should be held to account for investing in prevention, but not for running their own isolated R&D functions.

And city mayors and combined authorities have the heft to build approaches that sit well beyond the homelessness sector and embed primary prevention within mainstream public services, such as health settings, schools, and the criminal justice system.

It is also why national government must play a role as a catalyst: not delivering services, but providing the enabling infrastructure – data architecture, evaluation capability, shared procurement routes and implementation support – that allows the strongest approaches to spread with fidelity and pace. With national scaffolding behind them, combined authorities can turn individual successes into system-wide progress.

Labour’s manifesto for the 2024 general election promised a new strategy ‘working with mayors and councils across the country, to get Britain back on track to ending homelessness’.  The £100 million allocated from the Transformation Fund for homelessness prevention offers them the opportunity to do that. They must seize it.

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The homelessness strategy must tackle surging rough sleeping

New data released this week shows that rough sleeping surged to over 9,500 in July 2025. Centre for Social Justice (CSJ) analysis shows this is a 94 per cent increase compared to the same period in 2021.

One of the most disturbing trends in this week’s data is the entrenchment of long-term rough sleeping. In September 2025, nearly 4,000 people had been seen sleeping rough for multiple months, an increase of over a quarter (28 per cent) since September 2023. Long-term rough sleepers are now the largest group of people sleeping rough on our streets.

The Labour government inherited much of this mess – but on its watch the problem has only gotten worse. Rough sleeping hasn’t fallen in the government’s first year, just the Minister and Secretary of State.

Charity groups have been told the homelessness strategy is imminent. This is the government’s chance to tackle these trends head on and bring about the change and renewal it has promised.

Alongside an expected emphasis on prevention and temporary accommodation, the homelessness strategy must also contain a plan to reverse rough sleeping numbers, particularly the growing number of people who have been living on our streets long-term.

More of the same won’t cut it. Often people who have been homeless for years, or have complex problems like drug addiction or mental illness, cannot access housing through the current system. Many live their lives drifting, being passed between prisons, hospital wards, and hostels – at risk to the public and to the dangers of life on the streets.

Alongside Andy Burnham and Steve Rotheram, the CSJ has outlined a fully costed plan which would tackle these trends head on: a national rollout of Housing First. This approach has been successfully piloted in Greater Manchester, Liverpool City Region and the West Midlands, where 84 per cent of clients sustained long term housing after three years.

Housing First begins with a simple but powerful principle: a permanent home. From that solid foundation, people can access the tailored, wraparound support they need to address deep-rooted challenges. It’s an approach grounded in common sense, recognising that no one can rebuild their life whilst trapped in an endless cycle of homelessness, emergency accommodation, and crisis services.

The evidence is resounding and for a government strapped for cash, it has a 2:1 return on investment. Our plan is also fully funded. For just £100 million, the government could take over 5,500 people off the streets by the end of the Parliament, paid for by scrapping expensive relocation expenses for civil servants and cutting back the programme which moves them to the regions.

For a government seeking national renewal, it is hard to imagine a better place to begin than by ending the visible symbol of state and societal failure that is rough sleeping. If the homelessness strategy doesn’t fix this, it will be judged a failure, no matter what else it achieves.