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Boosting housing supply in Australia and Canada: much more than planning de-regulation

‘The national project to make housing more affordable is focused entirely on increasing supply [and] … The plan for meeting the supply target is to change planning laws and allow more density in middle suburbs…’ So wrote revered Australian economic analyst, Alan Kohler in 2025.

Especially when it comes to the official narratives accompanying national housing policy in the 2020s, similar comments could be made for other countries including Canada and the UK, to name but two.

Even so, Kohler’s pithy summary underplays the diverse range of approaches that governments are nowadays deploying in their housing supply-focused efforts.

Moreover, while largely centred on planning reform and other ‘market enabling’ measures, initiatives in Canada and Australia now include direct commissioning and funding of housing construction on a scale without recent precedent.

To identify internationally adaptable approaches to boosting housing supply, our new study compared the post-pandemic housing market challenges and policy approaches of Canada and Australia, two of the world’s most comparable nations.

Structural factors

In both countries housing affordability challenges have come to the fore in policy and political debate since the 2010s, with rising house prices and rents generally outpacing incomes. Thus, Canada’s national house price-to-income ratio rose from under 4.0 in 2003 to 7.7 by 2022, with a similar increase observed in Australia.

At the same time, the nature of the housing supply challenge in the early 2020s contrasts significantly across the two countries. Most notably, trends in apartment construction have markedly diverged. By 2024, such building starts had fallen by 48% from their 2016 peak in Australia, whereas Canadian unit commencements had surged by 71% over this period.

The main explanation for this contrast appears to be the revived vitality of Canada’s purpose-built rental (PBR) apartment industry in the post-Great Financial Crisis era. This is a sector far more strongly represented here than in Australia. Canada’s PBR construction surged more than threefold in the decade to 2024, representing a remarkable 42% of all housebuilding by that date.

As shown by the Canadian PBR industry’s relatively stable output in the immediate post-pandemic era, this speaks to the product’s resilience in the face of challenging market conditions. While abetted by favourable lending and mortgage insurance policies, the main explanation is probably the over-riding priority PBR investors place on long-term rental returns. This leaves them relatively sanguine about short-term market conditions and prospects.

Encouraging planning liberalisation

Efforts to both liberalise land-use zoning restrictions and streamline development approval processes are indeed central to contemporary pro-housing supply efforts in the two countries. However, federal administrations are constitutionally constrained here. Lacking powers to mandate planning policy (controlled by state/territory/local governments), federal influence must be transmitted indirectly.

In Australia this has been recently progressed under the Albanese government via the 2022 National Housing Accord. Central to this inter-governmental agreement was the commitment by signatory federal, state/territory and local authorities to ‘[i]mproving zoning, planning and land release’.

Accord participants also endorsed a national housebuilding goal to construct 1 million new dwellings 2024-29, later upped to 1.2 million homes within that timeframe. The federal government pledged a $AUD3B ‘New Home Bonus’ payable to state/territory governments conditional on achievement of jurisdiction-specific building targets.

Parallel Canadian efforts have centred on the federal Housing Accelerator Fund (HAF), a $CAN4B program to incentivise planning and other relevant reform by local governments. More subtly, HAF payments are intended to support municipalities growing housing supply ‘faster than [the local] historical average’.

As operationalised since 2023, Canada’s HAF program has involved federal-municipal agreements where, in exchange for pledged federal payments, lower tier governments have committed to specific planning reforms and other undertakings to expand housebuilding.

Beyond their status as ‘reward payments’ for relaxing or simplifying land use planning’, Canadian HAF subsidies fund other municipality actions on housing supply. This includes local commitments to channel such funds into affordable housing construction.

Other pro-supply measures

As unpacked in our research, though, pro-housing supply measures in both countries extend well beyond planning liberalisation. As represented to some degree in both Canada and Australia, these include:

  • Infrastructure funding support
  • Low-cost debt facilities and development de-risking
  • Federal property tax reform
  • Workforce capacity building
  • Technological development
  • Government-funded housing production
  • Identifying and allocating public land for affordable non-market development.

Generally, these interventions have been disproportionately larger and more ambitious in the Canadian case – especially when it comes to de-risking private housing development, and in financial support pledged for pre-fabricated (or ‘modular’) housing construction.

But, while ‘market enabling’ measures remain dominant, recent initiatives have seen both countries also pledging muscular interventions in the commissioning and funding of housing for both sub-market rent and sale. The new Build Canada Homes agency launched by the Carney government is tasked with ‘[constructing] affordable housing at scale’ – including $CAN4B loans and $CAN6B contributions to [non-market] ‘deeply affordable housing, supportive housing, Indigenous housing, and shelters’.

Meanwhile the Australian Government pledged in 2025 to commission 100,000 homes for (ring-fenced) sale to first home buyers over eight years. This revives a practice which contributed significantly to expanding Australian home ownership under the Keynesian consensus of the early post-war period, although subsequently absent for half a century until now.

The modern pre-occupation with expanding housing production while doing little to dampen housing demand remains highly questionable. But the range of pro-supply initiatives proceeding in countries such as Canada and Australia is far broader than the dominant ‘planning deregulation’ narrative implies. These extend to measures that, in their interventionist nature, arguably challenge decades of neo-liberal orthodoxy.

Much like its Australian and Canadian counterparts, the Starmer government’s housing reform narrative has overstated the scope for easing housing affordability through planning reform.

Lessons for the UK

As in those comparator nations, UK governments need to shift away from over-reliance on blanket efforts to boost market supply through development approval deregulation. Instead, taking a leaf out of Canadian and Australian books, the promised national housing strategy for England should embrace a wider range of pro-supply initiatives.

Emulating recent boundary-pushing measures under Premiers Carney and Albanese these measures should include more direct interventions that recall an earlier post-war era when such actions were standard practice.

Hal Pawson is an Emeritus Professor at the University of New South Wales Sydney. Steve Pomeroy is an Industry Professor at McMaster University, Hamilton, Ontario.

A version of this article first appeared on Australia’s Fifth Estate site. 

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Why the construction sector needs social housing

With 169,000 children growing up in temporary accommodation – the highest number since records began – the case for the government’s manifesto commitment to ‘deliver the biggest increase in social and affordable housebuilding in a generation’ is overwhelming. This situation damages children’s health and development, and it is costing councils across England £7.7 million every day. It is a national scandal whose social and financial costs are well-understood.

But social housing does more than provide an alternative to poor-quality homes. It is also the foundation of a successful housebuilding system. Building social homes at scale – including during market downturns – can underpin the government’s response to the crisis in construction skills and innovation. Far from being in conflict, social housing and market housing can support each other.

The inherent limitations of the UK’s development model

In a housebuilding system which relies excessively on speculative market housing, developers compete against each other to pay the most for land. Having taken on a large upfront risk through high land costs, developers then need to recoup their investment, building as slowly as necessary to maintain prices. But when sales prices soften, even moderately, market housing starts plummet. Developers are not incentivised to start new schemes if they will have to sell homes for less than they assumed when buying land.

To make matters worse, in tandem with increasing dependence on this speculative model of market supply, the UK’s social housing supply model has become pro-cyclical. Post-war social housing developments were close to 100% social housing. Most costs were covered by grant, and land was assembled at low cost outside the speculative market. This model was insulated from market cycles, allowing the supply of social homes to continue during downturns in private housebuilding. In other words, social housing supply at this time was counter-cyclical.

From the 1980s, the dominant supply model for social housing flipped: grant rates were cut, borrowing costs rose, social landlords had to start competing with private developers in the land market. As a result, an expanded range of ‘affordable housing’ tenures (with costs pegged to market prices) has become increasingly dependent on cross-subsidy from the profits of building market housing. Far from smoothing out the boom and bust cycle of speculative private housebuilding, this model of building social housing intensifies those peaks and troughs. This doesn’t just affect how many homes are built. It shapes how the construction sector itself operates.

Supporting the UK’s construction sector

Ratcheting down: Private housing completions in England since 1946

Over repeated cycles of the housing market, the total output of speculative development is ratcheting downward. As housing starts plummet, so too does the demand for skills and materials. Many construction workers simply leave the sector, often permanently. It is no coincidence that construction workers are more likely to be self-employed than workers in any other sector. Today, more people are leaving the construction sector than joining it, and productivity has remained stubbornly flat for decades. Why would housebuilders maintain a large permanent workforce, or invest in the skills of that workforce, when they know they will need to retrench supply as the market turns?

Because firms cannot predict demand, materials prices have become more volatile. Official statistics show sharp swings in construction output and brick deliveries, worsening shortages and price spikes in an import-dependent system. As the construction industry has adapted to manage the risks of cyclical demand, construction capacity has atrophied.

The long-heralded shift to modern methods of construction (MMC) has also stalled. The speculative, stop-start nature of the industry makes the expense and risks of investment in innovation unattractive. Investors are reluctant to commit to factories which will be moth-balled at the first signs of the next housing market slowdown.

From stop-start to build, baby, build

A more balanced system would combine market housing with a counter-cyclical social housing programme, alongside new market models based on stable demand such as Build to Rent.

When governments fund and enable social housing at scale, it can be built as fast as need demands and construction capacity allows. As the Farmer Review of the UK Construction Labour Model found in 2016, a major programme of social housing would support predictability of demand for labour, skills and materials, resulting in a less risky operating environment for housebuilders, developers and planners. The booms and busts of cyclical market supply are smoothed out by counter-cyclical social supply, so capacity can be maintained and increased despite housing market cycles.

In countries such as Japan and Sweden, innovations and new technologies have thrived on this certainty, creating new opportunities to expand development capacity. It is no coincidence that the last time that modern methods of construction made a major contribution to overall housing supply in the UK was during the post-war social housing boom.

Of course, the benefits of a more sustainable skills base and of innovation in construction today would be felt far beyond the developments which first enabled them. If social housing schemes keep construction workers in the sector during market downturns, those experienced workers will be available to the private sector when the market recovers. If social housing schemes provide enough stable demand to keep MMC providers in business, market housing will be able to benefit from their services, too. While construction capacity is often seen as a constraint on building more social housing, the reverse is also true. A stable pipeline of social housing would expand capacity, supporting more jobs, stronger skills, and greater innovation across the sector.

The government’s new Social and Affordable Homes Programme 2026-36 represents the most significant policy shift back towards a counter-cyclical social housing supply model in decades. A future blog will explore how this could work in practice, and what further changes are needed.

Would you like to write for Red Brick? Email rose.grayston@gmail.com to pitch your piece (c.600-900 words)

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We don’t believe you Mr Jenrick

Describing his controversial plans to scrap the contributions that developers make to affordable housing and other local infrastructure, Secretary of State Robert Jenrick told the BBC: “This isn’t giving more power to developers – we’re actually asking them to pay more.” As the interviewer Nick Robinson reminded him, he was asking an awful lot if he expects people to trust him on this issue, when not long ago he’d helped a Tory party donor avoid developer contributions on a major development in London. “You need to win people’s trust, Mr Jenrick,” he pointed out.

Ironically, developer contributions (“section 106” in the jargon) weren’t “a product of the 1940s Attlee government” as Jenrick told Today listeners, but of the Thatcher government, shortly before it came to its end in 1990. This is not the first time that the system has come under attack – the combined forces of George Osborne and Eric Pickles during the coalition government worked to erode its effects, pressured (as ever) by developers complaining about “red tape” and giving as their excuse for cutting it the need to revive housebuilding and the housing market after the global financial crisis.

But it did not work. Developer contributions went from strength to strength. Back in 2000/01 they provided only four percent of affordable housing in England, and under the last Labour government this barely changed, reaching less than six per cent by 2010/11. It was under the coalition and then Conservative governments that developer contributions really took off. By 2012/13 they provided a quarter of affordable housing output and by 2018/19 this had reached almost half of the total – all of them homes built without government grant. The harsh reality was that, because the government had cut the grants budget, developer contributions were vital if some reasonable level of affordable housing output was to be sustained.

Figure 1: Additional affordable housing supply started, agreed through S106 agreement 2015-2019, England
Source: The Incidence, Value and Delivery of Planning Obligations and Community
Infrastructure Levy in England in 2018-19 MCHLG, 2020

A report released quietly last week shows their importance even more sharply. The chart above is taken from the report and shows the recent growth in affordable housing supply resulting from section 106 agreements, broken down by tenure. The report says that contributions towards affordable housing alone were worth a total of £4.7bn in 2018/19; this was two-thirds of the total value of contributions, the remaining third going towards local infrastructure such as roads and schools.

To put this in perspective, the new Affordable Homes Programme announced by the Chancellor in March, and confirmed in his Summer Statement, is worth just £2.44bn annually, and this was flagged as a significant increase on the current programme, worth £1.95bn each year. In other words, what developers contributed to the delivery of affordable housing in 2018/19 is more than twice as much as the government paid out in grants.

The report has another statistic: 44,000 affordable homes were agreed in new planning obligations in 2018/19. This is a fall since 2016/17, but the value of this housing has increased over the same period due to an increase in house prices in many areas, with higher developer contributions. In 2018/19, the total of affordable homes built was 57,185, the highest in the last four years. Obviously the 44,000 new units arising from developer contributions will be spread over more than one year, but this comparison confirms their huge importance.

The new proposals would sweep away the existing section 106 agreements, which are negotiated locally, and replace them with a fixed national levy that would be based on the value of new developments. The amount would be set nationally but collected and used by local planning authorities.

What Mr Jenrick wants us to believe is that developers will pay more under this new system and that more affordable homes will be built as a result. He says the current system heavily favours the big volume housebuilders, which is true, and there is plentiful evidence of their finding ways to circumvent the system, not only by arranging to sit next to Mr Jenrick at Tory party fundraising dinners.

Indeed, his proposals do favour small builders, by proposing to exempt small developments of under 50 homes from the new levy that would replace section 106, at least for a limited period. But this worsens Mr Jenrick’s task, since small schemes currently do contribute to affordable housing. If he’s to be believed, and overall payments by developers towards affordable housing are to be even higher than the current £4.7bn, then big developers will have two extra burdens.

They’ll not only have to shoulder the contributions currently carried by small builders but will need to pay more on top of that. Developers have paid over £12 million to the Tory party since Boris Johnson took office: is this the return they expected for their investment?

<strong><span class="has-inline-color has-primary-color">Monimbó</span></strong>
Monimbó

Monimbó is a senior housing policy professional who has been a pseudonymous Red Brick contributor for many years.