Categories
Blog Post

A new generation of new towns in England

80 years after the Act which launched the post-war Labour government’s New Towns programme, the current government has set out its proposals for a new generation of New Towns. Between 1946 and 1970, 32 New Towns were designated in the UK (21 in England), generating homes for 2.8 million people. It was the most ambitious urban development programme ever undertaken by a UK government and was a key element in that government’s plans for tackling the acute housing problems it faced following six years of war and all the damage that had resulted.

Although the economic and housing problems facing the UK today differ in a number of respects from those of 1946, they are no less acute and call for bold and radical responses. Recognising that a New Towns programme could make a very significant contribution to resolving today’s challenges, the government decided, soon after coming into office in July 2024, to set up a Taskforce, chaired by Sir Michael Lyons, to recommend a new generation of New Towns. This week’s announcement is the government’s response to the Taskforce recommendations. The Taskforce report covered four main themes;

  1. The rationale for a New Towns programme
  2. The placemaking principles which should underpin the programme
  3.  Proposed New Town locations
  4.  The necessary delivery mechanisms and arrangements. 

There are strong economic as well as housing justifications for developing New Towns. Shortages of suitable and affordable homes constrain growth in many areas. Tackling the undersupply of homes requires a step change in output, which in turn depends on maximising the contribution of all potential providers, across both public and private sectors. A programme of planned developments at scale, comprising a variety of homes to meet the full range of needs, supported by necessary infrastructure, provides a real opportunity to accelerate the anaemic rates of housebuilding which have characterised recent years. It is no co-incidence that we have as a country failed to deliver over 250,000 homes a year since the 1980s when the earlier New Towns programme was wound down, along with the council housebuilding programme, by the Thatcher government.

If expanding the number of homes we build is an important objective, just as important is raising the quality of our new homes and their environment.  With this in mind, the Taskforce recommended a set of placemaking principles which should underpin the New Town programme. These are vital to ensure that the New Towns created under the new programme are exemplary places in which people will want to live, and in which they can feel proud and at home. The aim must be to create strong communities with the necessary facilities, social and physical infrastructure, attractive parks and green spaces, designed to meet sustainability and biodiversity objectives and to encourage healthy lifestyles.

The Taskforce proposed 12 locations, each suitable for developments of at least 10,000 homes, and with the potential to deliver between 250,000 and 300,000 homes. The government has given the go-ahead to seven of the recommended sites, with a combined potential for a little under 200,000 new homes. While this goes a substantial way towards the Taskforce aspirations, it does change the geographic spread, leaving a programme heavily focussed on London and the South East (Thamesmead and Enfield in London, Tempsford near Bedford and Milton Keynes), with two northern cities (Leeds and Manchester) and Bristol as the only outliers.

More peripheral sites proposed by the Taskforce (Marlcombe near Exeter, Plymouth, Heyford Park in Oxfordshire, Wychavon Town in Worcestershire and Adlington in Cheshire) are not being taken forward.  They are expected to receive support from government under other programmes, but their exclusion from the New Towns programme risks undermining its credibility as a national initiative. There is also the question of potential future sites elsewhere, which could potentially be added to the programme, as happened successfully in the 1950s and 1960s. This option should in my view be kept open, not least to ensure that the country takes the most benefit from the experience gained by the trailblazers.

The Taskforce made a series of recommendations on delivery mechanisms and arrangements which need to be put in place to enable the New Town programme to be progressed to best effect and most cost-effectively. The establishment of single-minded Development Corporations to oversee the planning and growth of each New Town, and the early public acquisition of land to enable the Development Corporations to control the pace and nature of the development in line with its approved Masterplan, are among the most important issues to be resolved. The foundations for a New Towns programme are now clearly in place and the government’s commitment this week to take it forward is very much to be welcomed. The challenge now is to ensure successful implementation.   

Categories
Blog Post

Delivering 1.5m new homes: setting up new development corporations – a blueprint for success

Introduction

The government is taking decisive action to address the housing crisis by proposing new development corporations to act as master developers. This initiative supports the ambition to deliver 1.5 million new homes. To aid this, the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government (MHCLG) has established the New Towns Taskforce, an independent expert panel.

The New Towns Taskforce report, published in September 2025, identified 12 potential new towns and proposed delivery via development corporations. The report argues that development corporations are the most suitable delivery vehicle, recommending they have Planning Authority powers.

Temsford in Bedfordshire is considered a promising first site, partly due to its proximity to existing and planned rail routes.

The House of Lords Built Environment Committee’s report, New Towns: Laying the Foundations, published in October 2025, includes a chapter on governance and stewardship of development corporations. It states: “Development Corporations should be the default governance and delivery structure for new towns and expanded settlements and should be used in all but exceptional cases.”

The Institute for Government’s Devolution and Regeneration Report, published in December 2024, outlines the case for mayoral development corporations, reviewing their history, operating models, and governance mechanics.

Currently, only a few mayoral development corporations exist, with the London Legacy Development Corporation serving as a successful example. More are expected as devolution expands.

Fundamentals for Establishing a Modern Development Corporation

To ensure these urban development vehicles exemplify best practice, they must be founded on clear principles. Having recently helped establish a circa 400,000 home multi-site development corporation outside of the UK, I outline twelve key fundamentals as a blueprint for success:

  1. Vision and Mission
    A development corporation must define a compelling vision and mission, including targets for social, affordable, and market housing. This vision should reflect local aspirations and support regional economic growth, providing diverse housing types and tenures.
  2. Market Analysis and Feasibility
    Comprehensive market research should assess demand across residential, commercial, civic, and mixed use assets. Feasibility studies must evaluate financial, environmental, and social viability, ensuring sites align with infrastructure and gain local support. Job creation, business growth, and transport connectivity must also be considered.
  3. Regulatory Context
    Understanding statutory powers and planning frameworks is essential. This includes aligning with recent planning reforms and clarifying how planning control is exercised, especially if within the corporation’s remit.
  4. Financial Strategy
    Detailed budgeting should underpin each phase. Funding from public-private partnerships, grants, loans, and private capital must be secured, with robust financial oversight. Strategic use of public funds for infrastructure, particularly brownfield, transport, utilities, and public services, should be paired with land acquisition and value capture to reduce long term reliance on government funding.
  5. Project Delivery and Management
    Professional development, urban planning, and project management are crucial. Dedicated teams should prepare master plans, while a Project Management Office (PMO) oversees implementation, ensuring deadlines, quality, and budgets are met. Design standards ensure consistent, high quality development.
  6. Skills and Capacity
    To become an employer of choice, corporations must invest in a skilled workforce supported by external consultants and engage delivery partners through robust capacity building strategies.
  7. Infrastructure Planning
    Planning should align with the government’s long-term infrastructure strategy, covering transport, utilities, waste, water, and digital networks. Social infrastructure, including schools, healthcare, community spaces, and green amenities, should be delivered concurrently with or before housing to ensure liveable neighbourhoods.
  8. Community Engagement
    Transparent public engagement is critical. Regular consultation with residents, businesses, and stakeholders ensures the master plan meets local needs and priorities.
  9. Inter Authority Collaboration
    Strong partnerships with local authorities ensure alignment with local plans. Early engagement with transport, health, education, and utility bodies is vital. Long term stewardship models must be established to sustain services and infrastructure.
  10. Sustainability, Resilience, and Innovation
    Design and construction must support the UK’s net-zero goals. Plans should address climate resilience and economic adaptability. Modern Methods of Construction (MMC) and SMART technologies can accelerate delivery and enhance quality.
  11. Marketing and Identity
    A strong, values led brand positions the new town competitively. Marketing should attract residents and investors, showcasing the town’s offer and long term vision.
  12. Monitoring and Evaluation
    Success should be measured via clear Key Performance Indicators (KPIs). Master plans must remain adaptable based on monitoring, community feedback, and pilot initiatives such as new financing models or build to rent schemes.

A Blueprint for Success

Lessons from previous development corporations and recent mayoral development corporations can guide this new generation of development corporations. Milton Keynes Development Corporation, arguably the UK’s most successful urban development corporation, provides a well-documented example.

Milton Keynes was established in 1967 and dissolved in 1992 upon completing its mission. It had powers to compulsorily purchase 22,000 acres of farmland, acted as its own planning authority, and managed infrastructure and social amenities, including public housing.

In addition to the outlined fundamentals, lessons should also be drawn from Milton Keynes or other similarly completed new towns so that best practice can be developed and included in establishing new development corporations.

By following best practices from the UK’s strongest examples and adhering to the twelve core fundamentals, development corporations can support the government’s housing goals, delivering sustainable, inclusive communities while raising standards for future urban development across the UK.

Categories
Blog Post Class of 2024

Standardising Section 106 agreements is overdue. Making it stick will be harder.

Anyone involved in housing delivery knows that negotiating and agreeing Section 106 has become one of the biggest drags on the system. It’s not because planning obligations are wrong in principle. Quite the opposite. Done well, they secure affordable housing, infrastructure and mitigation that make development acceptable and sustainable. The problem is the process.

I was pleased to host the recent launch of the Land, Planning and Development Federation’s work with Town Legal and Lord Banner KC on simplifying and standardising Section 106 agreements. Their report sets out a compelling case for reform, backed by hard evidence on delays. Data from the Home Builders’ Federation shows that average S106 timelines are now stretching well beyond a year, with some agreements taking several years to conclude. That’s time when homes that already have a resolution to approve are simply not being built.

There is a straightforward and sensible solution to addressing this delay. Introduce a national template for small and medium-sized schemes, reduce the endless re-drafting of boilerplate clauses and focus negotiations on what actually matters on a site; the local context and local need. A national template will deliver faster decisions and result in lower legal costs, improving viability, and removing friction from the process. For SME builders in particular, these delays can be the difference between a viable scheme and one that never gets delivered.

But we should be clear-eyed. Standardisation alone will not fix the problem.

I have seen first-hand how even well-designed standard documents can get picked apart in practice. We have been here before in the construction sector. NEC contracts were meant to simplify delivery and drive collaboration. PAS 91 was designed to streamline pre-qualification for public schemes. In both cases, lawyers across the system found ways to add caveats, amendments and bespoke wording until the standard became anything but.

There is no reason to think Section 106 will be immune from the same behaviour.

That is why Government has a critical role to play if this reform is to land properly. Guidance matters. The National Planning Policy Framework and Planning Practice Guidance needs to go further than warm words about engagement and efficiency. They should actively promote the use of standardised Section 106 templates, set clear expectations that deviation from agreed boilerplate should be the exception not the rule, and require local planning authorities to justify where and why they depart from national templates.

Centralising this element of planning will not strip councils of discretion. Local variation will always be needed and possible. But predictability, proportionality and pace are essential if we are serious about the delivery of 1.5 million homes. A standard starting point, backed by firm national guidance, gives councillors confidence, reduces risk for developers, and helps officers manage stretched workloads.

If our Secretary of State Steve Reed MP, and Housing Minister Matthew Pennycook MP are serious about building more homes, which I believe they are, especially through SME builders, then fixing the Section 106 process is essential. Simplifying and standardising is the right direction of travel. But without Government being explicit, consistent and firm in policy and guidance, the system will default back to complexity.

The opportunity is there. We should take it, and make sure it sticks.

Categories
Blog Post

Labour’s Commonhold Bill is the start of the end of the leasehold nightmare

Last week Labour published its Leasehold and Commonhold Reform Bill. It is an unquestionable triumph. Ground rents are capped at £250, commonhold is reinvigorated as a realistic tenure, and issues around forfeiture are put to rest.

Most importantly, it sets out a new mechanism for leaseholders to convert to commonhold without the previous requirement to have unanimity between all residents. 

This week is the start to the end of this nightmare, but it is a complex route. It will be up to leaseholders to transition buildings over to commonhold one-at-a-time, and this will be easier on some sites than others.

The Government has also clearly set out a different strategy for reform than their Conservative predecessor. While the Tories set out most of their reforms in two pieces of legislation, the Ground Rent Act (2022) and the Leasehold and Freehold Reform Act (2024), Labour’s programme is running on bespoke tracks, with varied primary and secondary legislation to address the wide variety of issues within leasehold.

So, taking a step back, what is Labour doing to end the leasehold nightmare and what will these changes mean for residents?

What is Commonhold? And how does Labour’s Bill change it?

Currently, most flat owners in the UK are leaseholders. They own everything within the walls of their home, but the overall site is owned by a ‘freeholder’, usually a larger company like a developer or a pension fund. This freeholder is responsible for shared communal areas, and the overall building.

Freeholders can appoint whatever organisation they want to manage the building (a ‘managing agent’), who often charge high fees while delivering a poor service. And freeholders themselves are often unresponsive and fail to act proactively to respond to leaseholders’ needs.

Commonhold is an alternative model introduced by Labour in 2002. Homeowners collectively own the whole site, and decide on things like which managing agents to appoint collectively.

However, a number of issues with commonhold mean that it was not widely adapted. It requires the consent of all leaseholders and their mortgage lenders, and there are a number of governance issues with commonhold that make it difficult for homeowners to manage buildings effectively.

Finally, without any incentive to build commonhold sites, developers have almost never done this, and instead can either keep the freehold to take some income themselves, or sell this off to another organisation.

Labour’s Bill fixes commonhold in three key ways:

  1. It bans all new leasehold flats except in exceptional circumstances, on which the Government is consulting currently.
  2. It introduces a new mechanism by which leaseholders can convert to commonhold with 50% of leaseholders consenting (or with unanimity if less than 50% of residents are ‘qualifying leaseholders’, such as in shared ownership blocks or where a freeholder lets out flats within a block).
  3. It has a wide array of fixes to commonhold which sort out its governance issues, from helping to appoint directors, to regulating dispute resolution and ensuring more responsible governance.

This will allow substantially more blocks across the UK to convert to commonhold, as thousands of sites have already reached the 50% threshold for other mechanisms within leasehold, such as collective enfranchisement and obtaining the Right to Manage.

What else is Labour doing on leasehold?

Within the Bill there is a lot more to be excited about. The ground rent cap will lower costs for nearly a million leaseholders paying over the £250 level, as well as eliminating the issue of homeowners being unable to sell properties with escalating ground rents. The new framework for forfeiture will prevent freeholders from being able to repossess homes for minor breaches of contracts or debts as low as £350.

The Housing Minister Matthew Pennycook also confirmed further primary legislation to make it easier for leaseholders to renew or ‘buy out’ their lease through reforms to the process of setting valuation rates.

And, outside of the Bill, Labour is acting to fix leasehold.

In order to tackle escalating service charges, new regulations are pending which will see a new regulatory regime for managing agents, increased transparency and scrutiny of costly major works, and a ‘right to veto’ managing agents which will make it easier for leaseholders to both request a change of managing agent and to decline a freeholder’s suggestion.

And a response is also pending to a consultation held over the winter period for freehold owners paying service charges on unadopted communal infrastructure (otherwise known as ‘fleecehold’).

After this – what will the challenges be?

Three main challenges exist for the Government less in enacting this reform.

First are the courts, the major residential freeholders are famously litigious and have already successfully held up delays to leasehold reform over the past year through launching a judicial review. While the appetite for further action is uncertain, the risk is present for freeholders to attempt this again, particularly over measures retroactively capping ground rent and overriding existing leases.

Second will be ensuring a smooth transition for the leaseholders who do want to move to commonhold. Getting rid of often distant, unresponsive and exploitative freeholder will be a huge improvement in the lives of millions of leaseholders. But shifting to making complex decisions about building management and safety in partnership with your neighbours also has difficulties. Reems of advice and support will be needed for new commonholders, particularly in blocks which do not have a long history of collective enfranchisement.

And finally will be what remains for the leaseholders who cannot convert. Even the reinvigorated commonhold, shared ownership will still be a separate permitted lease, and many blocks struggle to reach the threshold of 50% support for changes such as the Right to Manage because a large portion of the block are buy-to-let landlords. The Government does have an extensive reform programme to make leasehold fairer for these cohorts, but it will be worth monitoring the conversion process to see what more can be done for them.

Labour’s Commonhold Bill is the biggest change to housing law in years, and fundamentally challenges the concept of land and housing as an asset which underpins much of our problematic housing system. Such a bold change will require political will and expert attention to get right, and it is up to all of us in the Labour movement to get it over the line.

Categories
Blog Post

Delivering 1.5 million homes: transforming the vision into reality with a Target Operating Model

What is a Target Operating Model and Why is it Needed

A Target Operating Model (TOM) is a comprehensive strategic framework designed to align an organisation’s structure, functions, and processes with its overarching vision and mission. It serves as a blueprint for organising resources, workflows, and capabilities in the most effective way to support long-term goals, operational excellence, and the delivery of value to stakeholders.

The Government’s New Towns Task Force’s report in September 2025 identified 12 potential New Towns and proposed these are delivered by Development Corporations. A Development Corporation charged with delivering a large-scale urban development should at the very onset put in place a robust TOM before commencing a delivery programme to ensure strategic cohesion, operational readiness, and delivery efficiency.

Key Benefits of Implementing a Target Operating Model:

In the context of large-scale urban development, particularly in homebuilding programmes that include infrastructure and community infrastructure a well-structured TOM delivers a wide range of benefits that directly contribute to the success and resilience of an urban development delivery body such as a Development Corporation by proving for:

  • Strategic Alignment: Provides vision and direction that aligns with long-term goals and investment plans.
  • Operational Efficiency: Maps out processes and procedures aligning development, planning, construction and asset management.
  • Enhanced Governance and Risk Management: Defines roles and responsibilities, compliance and risk management.
  • Better Stakeholder Management: Customer focused, improving delivery for residents, investors, and government partners with consistency of standards and transparency improving trust with public and private stakeholders.
  • Agility and Scalability: Responds to market shifts, supports growth and innovation.
  • Improved Financial Management: Implements cost control and creates investment ready opportunities.
  • Talent and Capability Optimisation: Building a workforce that is aligned with business needs, with skills development.

A Target Operating Model Framework for Urban Development

An effective Target Operating Model (TOM) for an urban development organisation comprises a set of integrated components that collectively guide delivery, performance, and long-term value creation.

1. Strategic Foundation

A strong strategic foundation anchors the TOM. The organisation must articulate a clear vision and mission focused on delivering mixed-use, well-serviced communities supported by high-quality infrastructure and amenities.

2. Core Operating Pillars

a) Business Capabilities
The organisation requires end-to-end capabilities across the development lifecycle, including planning, land acquisition, infrastructure delivery, design and construction management, procurement, marketing, and long-term asset stewardship. Effective community engagement, strategic partnerships, and sound financial structuring are also essential to creating sustainable, people-centred places.

b) Organisational Structure and Governance
A central leadership team typically sets strategic direction, oversees finances, and develops business cases, while regional or project-based units manage local delivery. A clear governance model supported by roles such as CEO, CFO, and Head of Development, along with investment, audit, and compliance committees enables accountable, timely decision making and transparent reporting.

c) Key Processes
The TOM should establish a structured development lifecycle, with stage gates from feasibility through approvals, design, construction, and post-completion operations. Supporting processes include investment appraisal, regulatory compliance, stakeholder reporting, and customer engagement.

d) Data and Digital Infrastructure
A modern TOM relies on strong digital architecture. Integrated systems including GIS, BIM, CRM, and project management platforms should feed into a centralised data environment. This enables real-time monitoring of project progress, financials, ESG metrics, and operational KPIs, supporting accurate forecasting and evidence based decision making.

e) People and Culture
Workforce strategy should blend a skilled core team with flexible, project-based resources and specialist third-party partners. The culture must champion innovation, inclusivity, and sustainability, reflected both in internal practices and in how communities are engaged.

f) Performance Management
Performance must be routinely monitored through metrics such as Internal Rate of Return (IRR), schedule and cost performance, ESG outcomes, and customer satisfaction. Monthly and quarterly reviews provide insights that enable course corrections and reinforce continuous improvement.

Target Operating Model Implementation Roadmap

A TOM will require an implementation Roadmap delivered in stages before its considered as being effected.

  • Current State Assessment: Conduct a diagnostic review of existing capabilities, systems, and workflows, supported by a gap analysis to identify areas for transformation.
  • Design of the Future-State Model: Develop a tailored TOM framework that reflects the unique context and objectives of the organisation, drawing from proven models where appropriate.
  • Stakeholder Alignment: Engage key internal and external stakeholders to validate the model and ensure their support through structured consultation and co-design.
  • Implementation Planning: Develop a detailed, phased rollout plan, potentially organised by function, geography, or project type. Pilot programmes may be used to test and refine the model before full deployment.
  • Monitoring and Continuous Improvement: Establish a feedback loop using KPIs, data analytics, and stakeholder insights to refine the TOM on an ongoing basis and embed lessons learned.

Conclusion

A well-designed Target Operating Model is essential for any urban development delivery body such as a Development Corporation seeking to deliver complex, long-term infrastructure and housing programmes effectively. It not only aligns people, processes, and systems with strategic intent but also fosters transparency, trust, and agility in delivery.

The House of Lords Built Environment Committee’s recent Report, ‘New Towns: Laying the Foundations’ published in October 2025 has a Chapter on Governance and Stewardship covering Development Corporations. The report sets out many recommendations to encourage success and establishing Development Corporations with robust TOM’s can greatly support this success.

Categories
Blog Post

The Future of Home Buying: Can the government finally fix England’s broken housing transaction system?

After years of half-measures and failed initiatives, the government has again turned its gaze to one of Britain’s most frustrating institutions: the home buying process. It’s a system that is broadly recognised as broken – and one that successive governments have repeatedly promised, and failed, to fix.

The average home move now takes a staggering 205 days from listing to completion. One in three transactions collapses before completion, and £1.5 billion is lost each year through failed sales. These figures represent families stuck in limbo, renters unable to move, and buyers forced to reapply for mortgages as chains collapse around them.

This time, though, there are hopes across industry that the government appears serious. A  consultation on reforms to the system has been launched, and with cross-party consensus that the housing market’s inefficiency acts as a brake on growth, it marks the most significant modernisation attempt in decades. Whether it succeeds may depend less on political will and more on whether the government is ready to embrace the kind of digital innovation that transformed markets abroad.

A long road to reform

For years, the conveyancing process has been defined by paperwork, disconnected systems and inconsistent protocols. Each party – agents, lenders, conveyancers, surveyors, local authorities, and HM Land Registry – operates in its own digital silo, with limited interoperability. The result is predictable delays, duplication, and error embedded in almost every transaction, leaving Britain’s homes stuck as trapped liquidity in the housing market.

The consultation sets out an ambitious vision: a digitally enabled home buying and selling system with consistent use of upfront information, stronger regulation for estate agents, and better consumer protection. It also hints at exploring binding offers and AI-assisted conveyancing, though both remain long-term ambitions rather than immediate reforms.

Ministers argue that reform will “increase transparency, reduce fall-throughs, and improve trust”. It is language that feels familiar. In 2010, the last major reform attempt – the ill-fated Home Information Packs (HIPs) – collapsed under political pressure and technical confusion. Many in the industry fear history could repeat itself.

This time, there’s one crucial difference: the technology now exists to make reforms work.

Proven solutions from abroad?

Australia’s experience offers a compelling glimpse of what the UK could achieve. Over the past decade, the introduction of electronic conveyancing and a digital completion platform has transformed the buying process there.

PEXA is a digital property exchange platform that modernises the process of buying and selling property by allowing solicitors, conveyancers, and lenders to complete property transactions electronically, replacing traditional paper-based systems. Originating in Australia, its UK bespoke platform connects lenders and conveyancers in a secure shared digital environment, improving collaboration, automating financial settlement, and expediting title lodgement.

Through PEXA as the core infrastructure, all parties in a transaction – conveyancers, lenders, and land registries – can transfer funds securely, and validate and register title in real time.

The results are stark. The average settlement in Australia takes five weeks. [CD1] [LM2] [CD3] Settlement fraud has been virtually eliminated, requisitions (manual errors delaying registration) have fallen significantly, and there is consumer confidence in the process.

It is, in short, a working model of what a digital property market can deliver.

In the UK, PEXA has now built a platform specifically for the challenges of the UK market. NatWest is currently implementing PEXA with a view to transacting remortgage transactions by the end of the first half of 2026 and facilitating sale and purchase transactions down the line. The platform is the seventh regulated payment scheme in the Bank of England, and the first built specifically for property transactions. There is growing acknowledgement and excitement that secure, instantaneous completions are now possible on our shores too.

Whether government reforms can align with this kind of digital infrastructure remains uncertain. The consultation makes limited mention of payment and completion reform – a notable omission given that the key moment in a property transaction, when the money moves and title is transferred, remains the moment of greatest risk. Though measures like binding contracts might help prevent fall throughs, the government must ensure it focuses on fixing the act of buying and selling a home, the core transaction, not just the supporting processes.

The fraud problem

It’s a vulnerability that costs consumers and law firms dearly. Fraud is rising across the sector: 65% of law firms have faced cyber incidents and 30% of buyers have experienced property fraud, driven by payment diversion scams, bogus law practices and identity theft.

The structural problem is clear: money and title still move on separate tracks. Funds are manually transferred through generic banking rails, while title changes are lodged with HM Land Registry at some point after completion. In this gap – sometimes hours, sometimes days – the system is at its weakest.

A move towards centralised, regulated digital completion platforms, integrated directly with the banking system, would close that gap. It is a reform that goes beyond convenience; it’s a question of national financial security.

For now, though, fraud prevention appears only lightly referenced in the consultation – folded into broader ambitions around transparency and consumer protection. Many in the industry believe that’s a missed opportunity.

The politics of progress

With successive governments preoccupied with housing supply, conveyancing reform rarely tops the agenda. Yet 42% of buyers report mental health impacts from the stress of moving, and the workforce is under strain too: the number of lawyers practicing in conveyancing in England and Wales has fallen by 15% (from just over 13,000 in Sept 2021 to 11,140 in Jan 2025), reflecting burnout in a system burdened by outdated processes, extra administration, stress and delays.

The challenge, as ever, is sequencing. The financial transaction should sit at the centre of these reforms, not as an afterthought.

For the first time in years, there is genuine momentum. With digital infrastructure now being put in place, a coalition of reformers spanning government, fintech and conveyancing could finally deliver the modernisation that buyers and sellers have long been promised.

For a housing system long stuck in the 20th century, this consultation is a moment of truth.


Categories
Blog Post

Labour’s shift to homelessness prevention is a crucial opportunity for councils

Homelessness has rapidly become a key challenge facing local authorities. Spending by councils in England on temporary accommodation has reached £2.8 billion a year, up from £1.7 billion a couple of years ago.

This is causing great harm. There were 132,410 households staying in temporary accommodation in June 2025 because they risked homelessness, a record high. Almost two thirds are families with children.

Evidence shows us that children who experience homelessness do less well at school, have poorer health and are more likely to be impacted by homelessness in adulthood.

Costs are soaring but outcomes are worse. The reason? Homelessness spending is heavily skewed towards responses once individuals and families reach crisis. Our system reacts rather than prevents. Our aim must be to drive this system towards prevention upstream.

There are challenges in embracing prevention. Many local authorities are losing their institutional memory of what effective homelessness prevention involves; things like tenancy sustainment, legal support, advice on debt. Resources and capacity have been sucked into crisis interventions.

We also lack evidence of which prevention programmes work and provide value for money. This requires experimentation, coupled with independent evaluation.

Investing in prevention requires an up-front cost. Councils have to meet current demand and fund preventative services whose benefits take longer to emerge.

That’s why it was significant that Rachel Reeves, in the Spending Review in June, allocated £100 million over the next two years specifically for homelessness prevention. Its purpose is to ‘prevent homelessness through investing in early intervention measures’. Most of the money will come from the Transformation Fund to support fundamental reform of public services, overseen by the Cabinet Office.

Ideally, this should endow a national fund for research and development of early prevention initiatives to create change at a system level. Without national scaffolding – shared data, common evaluation standards and support for implementation – we risk repeating the “pilot malaise” that has held back progress for a decade.  It appears, however, that the Government’s preference is to pass this additional funding to local areas.

If so, it is critical that this additional funding does not top up councils’ current day-to-day homelessness spending, which will be drawn inexorably towards reactive crisis responses. More of the same will produce the same bad outcomes.

Local authorities should use part of this money to adopt or test promising early interventions.

This will require leadership. Prevention work is often less visible than crisis services. Polling evidence shows public support stronger for tangible things like emergency shelters, hostels and refuges than for prevention activity, although this still has majority support. When asked what would make the greatest difference in reducing homelessness, between 82% and 84% say refuges, safe houses and emergency housing, while 56% say investing in prevention services.

It will also require support. Some councils have shown they can innovate: the London Borough of Barking and Dagenham, for instance, used data it holds on residents’ financial stress, such as council tax arrears, to offer them targeted support such as a debt repayment plan.

Such initiatives are very much the exception, however, not the rule. Councils vary enormously in capability. Expecting each to design, procure and evaluate interventions independently leads to duplication, slow progress and uneven quality.

And, for local authorities that do develop effective prevention approaches a big question remains about how this learning can be shared and scaled across the system.

This is where metro mayors and combined authorities can advance the devolution agenda by stepping up and leaning in to this homelessness prevention challenge. Combined authorities provide an appropriate scale for rigorous testing and shared learning: large enough for unified datasets and specialist expertise, small enough to stay rooted in place. They can take on the capabilities individual councils cannot realistically build alone – intervention design, behavioural science, predictive analytics, flow management, and evaluation methodology – and help ensure prevention becomes the norm, not the exception.

The rigorous evaluation and learning that determines what truly works must be coordinated. Combined authorities can ensure councils are not left to reinvent the wheel, and that learning can be generated once and shared many times. Councils should be held to account for investing in prevention, but not for running their own isolated R&D functions.

And city mayors and combined authorities have the heft to build approaches that sit well beyond the homelessness sector and embed primary prevention within mainstream public services, such as health settings, schools, and the criminal justice system.

It is also why national government must play a role as a catalyst: not delivering services, but providing the enabling infrastructure – data architecture, evaluation capability, shared procurement routes and implementation support – that allows the strongest approaches to spread with fidelity and pace. With national scaffolding behind them, combined authorities can turn individual successes into system-wide progress.

Labour’s manifesto for the 2024 general election promised a new strategy ‘working with mayors and councils across the country, to get Britain back on track to ending homelessness’.  The £100 million allocated from the Transformation Fund for homelessness prevention offers them the opportunity to do that. They must seize it.

Categories
Blog Post

The homelessness strategy must tackle surging rough sleeping

New data released this week shows that rough sleeping surged to over 9,500 in July 2025. Centre for Social Justice (CSJ) analysis shows this is a 94 per cent increase compared to the same period in 2021.

One of the most disturbing trends in this week’s data is the entrenchment of long-term rough sleeping. In September 2025, nearly 4,000 people had been seen sleeping rough for multiple months, an increase of over a quarter (28 per cent) since September 2023. Long-term rough sleepers are now the largest group of people sleeping rough on our streets.

The Labour government inherited much of this mess – but on its watch the problem has only gotten worse. Rough sleeping hasn’t fallen in the government’s first year, just the Minister and Secretary of State.

Charity groups have been told the homelessness strategy is imminent. This is the government’s chance to tackle these trends head on and bring about the change and renewal it has promised.

Alongside an expected emphasis on prevention and temporary accommodation, the homelessness strategy must also contain a plan to reverse rough sleeping numbers, particularly the growing number of people who have been living on our streets long-term.

More of the same won’t cut it. Often people who have been homeless for years, or have complex problems like drug addiction or mental illness, cannot access housing through the current system. Many live their lives drifting, being passed between prisons, hospital wards, and hostels – at risk to the public and to the dangers of life on the streets.

Alongside Andy Burnham and Steve Rotheram, the CSJ has outlined a fully costed plan which would tackle these trends head on: a national rollout of Housing First. This approach has been successfully piloted in Greater Manchester, Liverpool City Region and the West Midlands, where 84 per cent of clients sustained long term housing after three years.

Housing First begins with a simple but powerful principle: a permanent home. From that solid foundation, people can access the tailored, wraparound support they need to address deep-rooted challenges. It’s an approach grounded in common sense, recognising that no one can rebuild their life whilst trapped in an endless cycle of homelessness, emergency accommodation, and crisis services.

The evidence is resounding and for a government strapped for cash, it has a 2:1 return on investment. Our plan is also fully funded. For just £100 million, the government could take over 5,500 people off the streets by the end of the Parliament, paid for by scrapping expensive relocation expenses for civil servants and cutting back the programme which moves them to the regions.

For a government seeking national renewal, it is hard to imagine a better place to begin than by ending the visible symbol of state and societal failure that is rough sleeping. If the homelessness strategy doesn’t fix this, it will be judged a failure, no matter what else it achieves.

Categories
Blog Post

Lessons learned from Australia: maximising the economic benefits of the £39bn Social and Affordable Homes Programme

The New Affordable Homes Programme

Announced in June 2025, the new Affordable Homes Programme replaces the previous scheme with a landmark £39 billion investment to deliver around 300,000 new social and affordable homes over the next decade. At least 60%, or approximately 180,000 homes will be for social rent, linked to local incomes. This represents the largest long-term investment in social and affordable housing in over 50 years.

Maximising Economic Benefits

Given the scale and importance of this programme, there is significant potential to drive economic growth and ensure strong value for public money. Drawing on my experience with a similar initiative in Australia, I’ve highlighted key lessons that could inform the UK Government’s approach to maximising economic impact.

Lessons Learned – The Australian Experience

In 2009, the Australian Government launched a A$5.25 billion Social Housing Initiative as part of its response to the global financial crisis. Over three years, it delivered approximately 20,000 new homes and refurbished 70,000, stimulating the economy, creating jobs, and helping Australia avoid the recession that impacted most Western nations.

Based on that experience, four key areas offer valuable insights for the UK’s housing programme:

  1. Capacity Building
  2. Strengthening the Supply Chain
  3. Streamlining Planning Processes
  4. Maximising Value through Modern Methods of Construction (MMC)

Key Recommendations to Maximise Economic Impact

1. Capacity Building

In Australia, government housing agencies needed external support to meet the demands of rapid programme expansion. In New South Wales, delivery was led by Housing NSW, where I observed that many new contractors and consultants lacked public housing sector experience. This led to steep learning curves, inconsistent delivery, and capability gaps.

Recommendation:
Introduce a phased integration of non-residential contractors and consultants, such as those experienced in student housing, military accommodation, or aged care accommodation sectors via pilot projects. This gradual approach will help scale up industry capacity effectively. A centralised Project Management Office (PMO) led by Homes England and staffed with housing specialists should coordinate delivery, support local authorities, share knowledge, and manage nationwide quality.

By expanding the initiative so that it involves the wider industry and not just the current public house building niche operators, public money is spread more evenly and further within the economy with minimal waste if integration is phased with PMO oversite.

2. Strengthening the Supply Chain

Australia’s programme faced delays and cost pressures due to shortages in materials such as insulation and bricks. Sourcing imported materials added further complexity and with limited or non-existent local content policies in place many products were imported i.e. plaster board from China.

Recommendation:
Develop a nationwide procurement strategy with flexible frameworks that support strategic bulk purchasing and distribution especially of Modern Methods of Construction (MMC) components. Development corporations or other delivery agencies could manage aggregated orders using bulk buy purchasing supply, achieving value for money while ensuring consistent supply.

Standardised yet adaptable design guidelines should prioritise UK manufactured materials, avoiding international supply chain risks and boosting local economic multipliers.

3. Streamlining Planning

To meet deadlines, some Australian states fast-tracked planning, but faced a backlash for reduced community input especially in established neighbourhoods areas. In some cases, developments proceeded that wouldn’t have under regular planning regulations.

Recommendation:
Pilot the UK’s recent planning reforms in established neighbourhoods, particularly on infill or ‘pocket’ sites. Retaining standard planning processes in sensitive areas can preserve public trust and reduce opposition. Community backing is vital, as developing within existing urban areas often leverages current infrastructure more efficiently than building on new sites.

While fast-track approvals may suit new, undeveloped locations, these often require major infrastructure investments (e.g., roads, schools), which can delay delivery and increase costs.

According to the IMF Paper Construction Planning Reforms for Growth and Investment published in 2024 the UK’s complex planning regulations can add 10% to any development costs. Therefore, any strategy to reduce costs for planning will allow more public funding to be spent on building more homes.

4. Maximising Value Through Modern Methods of Construction

Although MMC was adopted in Australia’s programme, its benefits were not fully realised due to the short-term nature of the initiative and lack of coordinated investment in design and manufacturing infrastructure.

Recommendation:
The UK’s 10-year Affordable Homes Programme offers a major opportunity to realise MMC’s potential. Unlike Australia’s 3-year initiative, the UK version can support a stable, regionally distributed pipeline of products over a longer period, giving manufacturers confidence to invest.

Past MMC challenges including manufacturer insolvencies stem largely from volume inconsistency and weak supply continuity. A national MMC strategy is essential, building on Homes England’s existing experience with MMC through its pilot schemes, funding models, and research.

This strategy should include clear commitments to long-term supply pipelines across regions. Strong coordination between planning authorities, housing providers, and MMC manufacturers is critical to unlocking sector growth and ensuring resilience.

According to a 2024 Report by Constructing Excellence/ BRE Benefits of Modern Methods of Construction in Housing costs could fall by a third if demand is grown and the sector scales up.

Conclusion

In delivering 300,000 new social and affordable homes in the next decade the Affordable Homes Programme offers the UK an opportunity to tackle housing shortages while simultaneously stimulating economic growth, job creation, and industrial innovation. However, to maximise the economic benefits, the government must act strategically in building capacity across the industry, strengthening local supply chains, streamline planning, and embracing MMC.

By learning from international examples and implementing structured, scalable policies, the UK can ensure that this investment delivers not only homes but long-term national prosperity.

Categories
Blog Post

Abolish Private Landlords?

It seems that the big winner of the party conference season was housing. Among the big stories were Kemi Badenoch’s announcement that the Conservatives will remove stamp duty of primary residences, the Green’s vote to “Abolish Landlords,” not mention Steve Reed’s distribution of ‘Build, baby, build’ caps.

I want to focus on the Green plans. There has been a knee-jerk response on both sides to this proposal with little meaningful analysis. Firstly, it is important to note the difference between the headline and the policy (reflecting the dissonance we see between some newspaper stories and the headlines). As the ex-leader and Bristol Central MP Carla Denyer noted, the policy does not ‘abolish landlords.’ The main thrust of the policy is to expand council housing through new build, buy back and the abolition of the right to buy and to bring in a raft of measures which removes the financial incentive to be a landlord by introducing rent controls, adding national insurance to rental income, bringing in a land tax, changing tenancies so they can only be ended by tenants and ending buy to let mortgages. 

The Green Party believes that these measures combined will reduce waiting lists as councils build more homes and squeeze private landlords and landlordism out of the housing market. The objective is clear but is it practical?

I think it is useful to look at the most affordable capital city in Europe with the largest council housing stock on the continent, namely Vienna. In Vienna, the council owns over 200,000 homes (and growing) and social housing is the tenure of choice for the vast majority of residents. However, council housing on its own does not create an effective housing system even here. There are also around 200,000 homes owned by housing association equivalents (which are completely ignored in the Green motion and in the Party Policy set out on their website) and a thriving private rented sector. While someone who has lived in Vienna for two years can apply for social housing, the place they wait (owner occupation is less than 20% of the stock) or if they are living there for a short period, is the private rented sector. There are rent controls on private rentals built before the war but not on newer properties, this ensures that there is still an incentive for the equivalent of the build to rent sector to provide new homes in the city. Vienna’s housing system would not work without a private sector element.

The Green Party website correctly notes that there are over a million households on council waiting lists and the party is committed to building 150,000 social homes in a year (again it is silent on housing associations, although the resolution only commits to finance for councils). The general churn in social housing tenancies is falling behind of demand but let us assume for this argument that it neutral, i.e. that the number of people joining the waiting list matches the numbers rehoused in social housing relets. To clear the current waiting list would be 7 years. Where will people live for those seven years if there is no private rented system, assuming, I think completely reasonably, that they cannot afford to buy.

Where will people who do not qualify or will not be a priority for council housing and who cannot afford to buy live? This includes students, mobile workers, single men, childless couples etc.

While I understand the motivation for the policy, I honestly have no understanding of how this produces a workable practical housing system. If the road to hell is pathed with good intentions, this is that road. In the short to medium term this policy would result in massive levels of homelessness, much worse than now. And as a postscript I would love to know what the Green Party policy position on housing associations is, the current one seems to assume a false dichotomy of council housing (with maybe some cooperative and community led housing thrown in) and private landlords. It is just not that simple.