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A message to Andrew Griffith: cut build costs, not social housing

At the Conservative Party Conference yesterday, Shadow Chancellor Andrew Griffith promised to pare back regulation in a bid to cut the cost of building a new home by £50,000. Pledges include: scrapping changes to improve the energy efficiency of new homes; abolishing Natural England and the Environment Agency; and introducing a new ‘one stop levy’ on developers to replace the much-maligned system for delivering social homes and infrastructure through the planning system.

This blog will focus on the last of these, and why it is a tried and tested dead end for building social homes.

How do planning obligations work?

Currently, Section 106 (S106) agreements and the Community Infrastructure Levy (CIL) secure a share of social and affordable homes as part of private housing schemes, as well as investment in roads, public transport, schools and doctors’ surgeries. Councils effectively cream off some of the profits from private development to ensure local people see and feel the benefits of new housing.

This system of planning obligations has the significant advantage of delivering social homes and infrastructure alongside private homes, but it also results in lengthy negotiations between councils, landowners and developers about exactly what will be provided, when and where.

These problems are aggravated by site-level viability assessments, which allow planning obligations to be negotiated down if a planned development won’t make enough profit to incentivise landowners to sell and developers to build. Because there is no standardised approach, viability appraisal is often described as a ‘dark art’. In some cases viability appraisals have been submitted showing a site is loss-making to reduce or eliminate social housing before it is sold on for a profit. The mistrust and uncertainty this has created adds time and cost to development.

The Infrastructure Levy: a cautionary tale

There have long been calls from academics, think tanks and others to replace S106 and CIL with a ‘one stop’ cash payment of the kind Griffith has just advocated. In fact, the last Conservative Government had a good go at doing so through its Infrastructure Levy, under which developers would pay a non-negotiable cash tax on the final value of private homes. But they ultimately ditched the deeply unpopular plans, widely seen as unworkable and likely to deliver worse outcomes than S106. 30 organisations – including private developers, councils, Housing Associations, planners and construction industry leaders – wrote to the then Secretary of State Michael Gove in favour or ‘retaining and continuing to improve’ the existing system of planning obligations. The current Shadow Cabinet should take note.

Below are four of the major drawbacks of switching from in-kind delivery to cash payments for the supply of social homes through the planning system.

1.    Fewer social homes in the places where they are needed most

If developers pay a financial levy instead of delivering social homes as part of private schemes, there is no guarantee that replacement homes will ultimately be delivered in the same area. Councils or Housing Associations would have to compete in the open land market for sites. In some places, suitable sites will not be available. Social landlords often struggle to compete with private developers’ land teams, which have greater resources, skills and experience.

S106 secures social homes in precisely the places grant has struggled to reach – places where higher demand for market homes pushes up land prices. Replacing it with cash risks fewer social homes in the least affordable places; more people in housing need moving away from communities, jobs, schools and care networks; more economically and socially segregated communities; and fewer direct benefits from new development for local people.

2.    Lower, slower social housing supply

An S106 home is a completed home ready for someone to move into. Before money raised from a ‘one stop levy’ can become a social home, the council or HA must assemble all the other ingredients needed to turn cash into homes: land with planning permission, a viable package of funding and finance, labour and materials. This is likely to take at least two years from start to finish. The result is fewer homes delivered later.

3.    Inflation and market changes erode the value of cash

Unlike a completed social home, the value of a levy transferred to a council is exposed to changing market conditions. By the time a council has assembled the other ingredients needed to turn cash into homes, construction costs will have increased, land values may have risen, borrowing costs may be higher, grant and other funding may have changed. Tax that would have funded a given number of homes when received will fund fewer homes several years later – a point backed up by research from University College London.

4.    Missed opportunities to rehouse those in need

Most importantly, every year of lost social housing supply is another year in which households remain in Temporary Accommodation, unsafe homes or on the streets. Councils would continue paying high costs for TA or other temporary solutions, and the taxpayer would continue paying high levels of housing benefit into private TA or to private landlords, rather than using the money for permanently affordable homes.

Taking on high build costs

The problem of rising build costs is real and pressing. The Home Builders’ Federation estimates they have risen by £76,000 per home since 2020. Surveys of social landlords likewise flag rising build costs as a key barrier to increasing supply.

Much of this reflects rising material and labour costs as geopolitical shocks have collided with a construction sector held back by stagnant productivity. But it is also true that builders of all types of homes are facing a sharp increase in the costs of policy compliance as many new requirements come into effect over a relatively short period of time: the Future Homes Standard, the Building Safety Levy and Biodiversity Net Gain, to name a few. These policies are needed to clear up the Conservatives’ mess on building safety while improving England’s resilience to the climate emergency. Nonetheless, they contribute to a genuine challenge.

The question is, would binning the Section 106 system help or hinder housebuilding? The recent experience of the Infrastructure Levy suggests the Conservatives’ proposal for a ‘one step levy’ would be wasteful distraction from the real work needed to drive down build costs, absorbing time and resources from industry and all levels of government – and it would, of course, produce fewer social and affordable homes, reducing overall housing supply and curtailing opportunities for innovation in the construction sector.

The Government has undertaken sweeping planning reforms to start controlling costs, with more planned – but planning reforms from central government are unlikely to be enough. Fortunately, there are many other opportunities to bring down build costs, such as smarter procurement, finally catching up with the rest of the developed world in the use of Modern Methods of Construction, and addressing the unusually low productivity of our construction sector.

While there is a role for central government, mayors will be best placed to seize many of these opportunities. As devolution progresses, I’d like to see mayors take on the build costs challenge. Could better organisation of funding and powers across housing, transport, planning and skills at the regional level strip out cost more effectively than any central government initiative? And could mayors do so by working with social housing, rather than against it?

Would you like to write for Red Brick? Email rose.grayston@gmail.com to pitch your piece (c.600-900 words)

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Standardising Section 106 agreements is overdue. Making it stick will be harder.

Anyone involved in housing delivery knows that negotiating and agreeing Section 106 has become one of the biggest drags on the system. It’s not because planning obligations are wrong in principle. Quite the opposite. Done well, they secure affordable housing, infrastructure and mitigation that make development acceptable and sustainable. The problem is the process.

I was pleased to host the recent launch of the Land, Planning and Development Federation’s work with Town Legal and Lord Banner KC on simplifying and standardising Section 106 agreements. Their report sets out a compelling case for reform, backed by hard evidence on delays. Data from the Home Builders’ Federation shows that average S106 timelines are now stretching well beyond a year, with some agreements taking several years to conclude. That’s time when homes that already have a resolution to approve are simply not being built.

There is a straightforward and sensible solution to addressing this delay. Introduce a national template for small and medium-sized schemes, reduce the endless re-drafting of boilerplate clauses and focus negotiations on what actually matters on a site; the local context and local need. A national template will deliver faster decisions and result in lower legal costs, improving viability, and removing friction from the process. For SME builders in particular, these delays can be the difference between a viable scheme and one that never gets delivered.

But we should be clear-eyed. Standardisation alone will not fix the problem.

I have seen first-hand how even well-designed standard documents can get picked apart in practice. We have been here before in the construction sector. NEC contracts were meant to simplify delivery and drive collaboration. PAS 91 was designed to streamline pre-qualification for public schemes. In both cases, lawyers across the system found ways to add caveats, amendments and bespoke wording until the standard became anything but.

There is no reason to think Section 106 will be immune from the same behaviour.

That is why Government has a critical role to play if this reform is to land properly. Guidance matters. The National Planning Policy Framework and Planning Practice Guidance needs to go further than warm words about engagement and efficiency. They should actively promote the use of standardised Section 106 templates, set clear expectations that deviation from agreed boilerplate should be the exception not the rule, and require local planning authorities to justify where and why they depart from national templates.

Centralising this element of planning will not strip councils of discretion. Local variation will always be needed and possible. But predictability, proportionality and pace are essential if we are serious about the delivery of 1.5 million homes. A standard starting point, backed by firm national guidance, gives councillors confidence, reduces risk for developers, and helps officers manage stretched workloads.

If our Secretary of State Steve Reed MP, and Housing Minister Matthew Pennycook MP are serious about building more homes, which I believe they are, especially through SME builders, then fixing the Section 106 process is essential. Simplifying and standardising is the right direction of travel. But without Government being explicit, consistent and firm in policy and guidance, the system will default back to complexity.

The opportunity is there. We should take it, and make sure it sticks.

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Reforming Section 106 is crucial for a generational boost in social housing

The Section 106 (S106) planning obligation system has long been the backbone of affordable housing delivery across England. Yet, far from being the robust solution we need, it has morphed into an inadequate sticking plaster, barely concealing a profound crisis in genuinely affordable, social rented housing. The more reliant we have become on S106 agreements, the fewer homes we’ve actually delivered. It’s high time we confronted the reality: our dependence on developer-led contributions is fundamentally failing to deliver the homes communities desperately need.

First conceived in the 1990 Town and Country Planning Act, S106 was originally intended to mitigate the localised impacts of new developments—addressing pressures on local infrastructure like schools, healthcare, and transport. Generally, there are two ways to fund social and affordable housebuilding: through government spending via grants or loans, or through developers’ contributions. However, over time, as state-backed social housing provision shrank dramatically, S106 evolved far beyond its initial scope, becoming a primary vehicle for affordable housing supply. Today, it accounts for a staggering 38% of social homes and half of all affordable homes delivered annually. But instead of a sign of success, this reliance reveals a deeply flawed approach.

The current mechanism incentivises developers to prioritise ambiguous and often less suitable housing tenures such as shared ownership or ‘affordable rent’—both considerably less beneficial than genuinely affordable social rented homes. Worse yet, developers frequently opt out of construction obligations altogether, preferring financial payments to already overburdened local authorities with little capacity to use this funding to build. Indeed, while the government’s recent pledge to recruit an extra 300 local planning officers is a positive step, it falls significantly short, replacing fewer than one in ten of the planning positions cut throughout the 2010s. This leaves local authorities severely under-resourced to effectively manage and enforce S106 obligations.The result is clear: fewer actual homes and a deepening crisis.

The viability assessment process, designed to test whether developers can meet planning obligations without compromising profits, has further exacerbated the problem. Despite high-profile cases—like the infamous Battersea Power Station development—raising awareness of exploitation, the truth is that these viability assessments routinely undermine local authorities. Too often, developers reduce or even eliminate their affordable housing commitments entirely by claiming financial unfeasibility. This opaque and subjective process means fewer social homes are built, and crucial opportunities for alleviating housing pressures are lost, often permanently.

Ironically, the reliance on S106 has only deepened since government funding for social housebuilding was drastically cut post-2010. With austerity measures stripping away substantial grant-funding streams, we increasingly looked to developers’ contributions as a makeshift replacement. But the numbers don’t lie. While government targets aim for 300,000 new homes annually, just 7,500 social homes were built in England in 2022/23, down alarmingly from nearly 40,000 a decade ago. Even more starkly, Right to Buy alone axed more than 14,000 social homes out of circulation in the same period, meaning we have had a net loss in social housing stock. Clearly, our existing approach is broken, underlined by the fact that the more we’ve depended on developer contributions, the fewer genuinely affordable homes we’ve managed to produce.

But diagnosing the problem is just the first step. We must urgently pursue substantial reforms to the S106 framework, starting by prioritising the construction of genuinely affordable social rented homes within all agreements. Introducing a mandatory minimum percentage of 15% for social rent tenures within S106 obligations would directly counter developers’ preference for less socially beneficial tenures or financial opt-outs. This simple measure would clarify obligations, remove ambiguity, and most importantly, deliver the genuinely affordable homes that communities across the country desperately need.

Additionally, we must reform the viability assessment process fundamentally. Transparency must become mandatory, and local authorities need enhanced powers and resources to scrutinise developers’ claims effectively. A revised, robust viability framework would prevent abuse, accelerate negotiations, and ensure that developments truly contribute to local housing needs rather than merely inflating developers’ bottom lines.

These immediate reforms are essential but insufficient on their own. Ultimately, the underlying crisis in social housing demands a significant increase in direct government investment. We must look to the next phase of the Affordable Homes Programme, as well as the new £2bn boost, as an opportunity to refocus explicitly on social rented housing. A clear national target backed by meaningful public investment could not only reduce reliance on developers but would restore the stability and predictability required to deliver social housing at scale.

The stakes could hardly be higher. Without these reforms, the government’s ambitious housing targets will remain forever out of reach, and our housing crisis will only deepen. The reliance on a failing S106 system is simply unsustainable. It’s time we embraced a more ambitious, government-backed strategy for social housing delivery—a strategy that prioritises homes over profits, transparency over obfuscation, and genuine affordability over sticking plasters. Only then can we build the future our communities truly deserve.

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Capital funding can keep the economy moving

A Brief History of Time

Housing affordability, or more precisely the lack of it, has been the perennial policy issue of the past decade. Successive Governments have appreciated the scale of the problem, if not the effectiveness of the tools with which they have chosen to address them.

Subsequently, a seemingly endless slew of schemes, initiatives, and re-heated ideas (and no small amount of funding) have been thrown at the task at hand, but with very mixed results. The consequences for those on the periphery of society have been nothing short of catastrophic.

Looming Threats

The past 40 years has seen the state very deliberately reduced the role of public bodies in the direct provision of housing, see Municipal Dreams by John Broughton for an excellent overview of this sorry state of affairs. Councils, once a leading provider of new housing, have been removed from the picture almost entirely.

Housing Associations, now the state’s preferred deliverer of social housing, have never been able to match the numbers of their Local Government counterparts. Whilst a move to a ‘property owning democracy’ has seen the deliberate failure to replace housing sold via Right To Buy, decimate social housing stock levels.

The National Housing Federation (NHF) estimates an additional 350,000 homes per year are required until 2031, with 145,000 of those each year needing to be an Affordable housing product (NHF 2020).

For context with the 241,000 homes completed in 2018-19, was a 30 year high. In short, both Government and the Market have failed to produce the housing we need as a country.

Consequently, and perhaps somewhat bizarrely, England becoming increasingly reliant on the market to deliver social housing. Just over 40% of all social and affordable housing units were delivered via Section 106 (S106) obligations in the period 2015/16 – 2018/19 (MHCLG, 2020 Live Table 1000S). This is manageable in a rising housing market, but as we head towards a sharp economic downturn, it is unlikely to remain the case.

Putting it bluntly, developers do not develop when the we are in a recession, well at least nowhere near as much. So, whilst there will be a certain amount of ‘flow through’ for S106 agreements from developments already in motion, we are likely to see a drop in social housing being delivered through this part of our planning system.

More problematic is this Government’s choice of direction on housing policy means we’re likely to see even fewer social rent units being delivered. Its flagship policy, the First Homes initiative, will heavily rely on S106 contributions as a delivery mechanism (MHCLG 2020) thus the (already low) output of submarket rented homes will reduce further.

The sums involved are not insignificant. NHF estimates increases in current grant provision, to the tune of £1bn per year (NHF 2020), would be required to mitigate the loss of sub-market rented homes from S106 due to the rebirth of this aborted Starter Homes programme.

Required Approaches, History Repeating

So, what can reasonably be done? During the Covid19 crisis we have seen some extraordinary, justified, Government interventions. It is necessary to extend such moves further into the housing market. Housing is by one of the key policy areas where Government can drive counter cyclical measures.

By providing capital funding at a time when many developers will be scaling back production, we can keep elements of the economy moving. It is estimated that for every £1 spent on construction, output stimulates £2.84 in Gross Domestic Product (Capital Economics 2019) and thus for a Government, this is money well spent.

Over the long term the figures are significant.

In its report for the LGA (and others), Building New Homes – an updated economic appraisal, Capital Economics estimates that up to £320bn could be generated through increased economic activity (LGA 2020).

Elsewhere, as and when developers get into trouble during the market downturn, going back to the future may provide the way forward. The National Housing Clearing Scheme successfully saw the Housing Corporation (as was) provide £350million for the purchase of 9,600 homes following the 2007/08 crisis (Hansard 2009).

It enabled the addition of stock into the social rented sector, whilst enabling developers struggling to shift completed units off their books. Indeed it’s been one of the key recommendations from the Commons Select Committee for Communities and Local Government Interim Report on protecting rough sleepers and renters (CSCCLG 2020) and a reboot of the scheme should be a serious consideration.

Combating housing inequality needs public funding

For decades with have held back some of the most effective tools to combating housing inequality and market dysfunction in the UK. Sustained and expansive, publicly funding, housing development.

It is no coincidence that the greatest number of homes were built when Local Government was enabled to directly provide public housing. This needs to be revisited in earnest otherwise we are doomed to repeat the errors of the previous decades.

<strong><span class="has-inline-color has-accent-color">Neil Goodrich</span></strong>
Neil Goodrich

Neil Goodrich has been in the in social housing sector for just over a decade. A Chartered Member of the Chartered Institute of Housing (CIH) and Former Chair of CIH Futures.

He currently works as a Business Insight Manager for Orbit, a Housing Association that operates in the Midlands, East Anglia, South and South East.