Fiscal rules Archives

The Prime Minister has made clear his ambition: to “oversee the biggest council house building programme since the post-war period”. This is a hugely positive step forward for the Government’s housing policy; it marks a generational break with 45 years of housing policy that failed to articulate a clear aim beyond merely maximising overall output – with little regard to affordability for people on low incomes or at risk of homelessness. And, crucially, it will help to capitalise on councils’ knowledge of local housing need, significant land value capture powers, and masterplanning capabilities.

Yet the decline of council housing was driven not only by housing policy, but by the rise of restrictive fiscal policy that actively constrains government investment in social homes and has pushed Housing Revenue Accounts (HRAs) into existential financial jeopardy. Despite being justified under the guise of ‘fiscal responsibility’, debt-to-GDP spiked sharply during austerity while investment in public assets like social housing collapsed and vital services were cut – demonstrably impoverishing both people and the state.

At the Autumn Budget, to realise its ambitions on council housebuilding, the Government must reconnect political ends with economic means and drive a change in economic consensus that places social housing investment at the centre of national renewal. In an upcoming report on council house building, we argue the Budget marks a clear opportunity for the Government to cancel £31.8bn in HRA debt to unlock councils’ capacity to build, covered in detail here, and do more to bring forward and increase funding – ensuring its fiscal framework supports rather than hinders greater investment in council and social homes.

The financial and economic case for cancelling HRA debt and increasing investment

Modelling commissioned by Shelter and undertaken by Pragmatix sets out an ambitious scenario for the Government to cancel HRA debt and provide the necessary investment to deliver 284,000 social rent homes within a 10-year trajectory – in addition to those already expected to be delivered through the Social and Affordable Homes Programme. Pragmatix estimates that the economic benefits of the policy would outweigh its costs within twenty years, around a decade after the final homes are built. Over the report’s 60-year appraisal period, the modelling estimates a net economic benefit of £141.5 billion, including substantial savings to the public sector from reducing reliance on more expensive forms of housing. Government departments are estimated to save £64.7 billion over the period, including £26.3 billion for the Department for Work and Pensions, while savings to councils from reducing the number of households in temporary accommodation eventually reach £672 million a year.

Cancelling HRA debt is broadly fiscally neutral; the majority of debt is owed to Treasury, meaning it is largely a series of inter-government transfers, involving cancelling debt that the public sector owes to itself.

The fiscal framework should support rather than hinder investment

Within this Parliament, debt cancellation and delivery, as outlined above, is also compliant with the Government’s ‘investment rule’, using around 56% of the current ‘headroom’ as of the OBR’s 2026 spring forecast. While council and social housing is a more-than-worthy use of investment ‘headroom’, this self-imposed restraint on public investment creates artificial trade-offs with other policy areas and reduces the Government’s appetite to increase funding. More flexibility is therefore needed within the fiscal framework to ensure that the long-term economic net benefit of investing in social housing is recognised.

The Government’s fiscal framework disincentivises social housing investment

The narrow and short-term focus of the current fiscal framework discourages social housing investment and hinders the Government’s aim of delivering a council housing revolution. Firstly, the Government’s rolling target (the ‘investment rule’) requires its chosen debt measure to be falling as a share of GDP in the third year of the OBR’s forecast period – but this disregards the longer-term savings and additional revenue social housing generates.

Secondly, the Government’s chosen debt measure – Public Sector Net Financial Liabilities (PSNFL) – fails to value the physical asset created on the Government’s balance sheet when it funds a new social home.

Thirdly, PSNFL creates a two-tier fiscal system that favours social housing delivery through housing associations and for-profit registered providers over public-led social housebuilding from councils and development corporations. Unlike most EU countries that use a general government debt measure, PSNFL includes the entire public sector. It means that our fiscal rules include the debt of our public social housing providers, even though their debts are paid for by rents and other independent income as opposed to taxation or wider government expenditure – i.e. they are classed by the ONS as ‘market producing’.

Finally, because of this public-sector focus in the debt measure, the central government financial asset recorded under PSNFL when investing in council housing (created by loaning money to HRAs via the Public Works Loan Board) is actually netted off by the liability held by the loan recipient (the council or development corporation) in the national accounts. This leaves only the liability on the Government’s balance sheet created from the borrowing it undertook to ‘fund’ the loan. In contrast, liabilities held by private registered providers to pay back loans to central government are excluded from PSNFL, making these loans more fiscally attractive for central government: the asset (the loan) and liability (borrowing to ‘fund’ the loan) held by central government cancel each other out.

The consequences for social and council housebuilding are stark

Rather than seeing good growth and healthy public finances as the outcome of social housing investment, the current framework forces housing policy towards day-to-day spending on housing benefit and expensive temporary accommodation – which flows outwards from the public sector to private landlords. Investment remains far below what is needed:

Social and Affordable Homes Programme grant, while welcome, only enables the delivery of 18,000 social rent homes a year on average – we need to deliver 90,000 a year for 10 years to end the housing emergency.
Interest rates from the Public Works Loan Board available to HRAs remain far too high with 50-year maturity lending at around 6%.
HRAs and public development corporations are excluded from £2.5 billion in 0.1% interest loans recently provided to housing associations and for-profit providers, a distinction that reflects their different treatment within the fiscal framework.

Fiscal reform is needed to support the scaling up of council housing delivery

To deliver its promise of a council housing revolution, the Government must scale up current grant funding and available low-cost finance to much higher levels. In doing so, it must ensure that councils and development corporations, who were the key players of the post-war social housing boom, are empowered to support the Government’s social housing ambition. In an upcoming report later this month, we argue that, if the Government remains committed to not change the current fiscal rules, it should instead exclude HRAs and development corporations from PSNFL. This would finally end central government incentives to limit their borrowing, devolving power to HRAs and development corporations, and support the Government to provide them with the low-cost loans needed to deliver social housing at scale.

Email your councillor today and ask them to add their name to a letter to the chancellor, urging him to knock down the barriers to getting councils social homes again. https://campaigns.shelter.org.uk/tell-your-cllr-fight-for-social-homes

Would you like to write for Red Brick? Email rose.grayston@gmail.com to pitch your piece (c.600-900 words)

Before the 2024 General Election, I had the privilege to work with England’s largest council landlords on Securing the Future of Council Housing. The report set out five key recommendations to allow councils to once again play a major role in housing supply, and to refurbish and improve existing homes and neighbourhoods after decades of under-investment.

It is an ambitious vision for a new, better relationship between central government and council landlords. Over 100 councils led by different parties across the country backed the report, laying the ground for a powerful coalition which has successfully influenced Government policy since. Every council involved has been essential in raising the volume of council housing’s voice, but particular credit should go to the London Borough of Southwark under Kieron Williams’ leadership for kickstarting the campaign, and to Sheffield City Council and Leeds City Council for helping it spread.

On Monday, Andy Burnham pledged the ‘biggest council housebuilding programme since the post-war period’ – a period when councils delivered over 4 million homes in 36 years. Since that time, more council homes have been sold than new ones delivered. It’s been a long wait, but it may finally be time for a renaissance in council housing.

But can we afford it?

Yet serious questions are being asked about whether we can afford it. This is not just because it costs money to build low-cost social homes. It is because councils are public bodies, and their borrowing is ‘on balance sheet’. Most social homes in England today are owned and delivered by non-profit Housing Associations, whose borrowing is ‘off balance sheet’. It doesn’t count towards public debt. That difference has shaped housing policy for decades.

In this blog, I’m going to try to demystify the impact of council housing on public debt, and how the UK’s fiscal rules change things.

How council housing came under financial attack

Council housing is treated differently from all other council-owned assets in accounting terms. Council landlords keep rental income in a Housing Revenue Account (HRA), which is kept separate from other council income. This is to protect social tenants’ money, so it doesn’t get used to fund general council services.

In 2012, the Government and councils agreed a ‘self-financing settlement’ aiming to make HRAs more independent and more sustainable. The settlement was supposed to give councils the financial certainty to invest in their homes, but it was quickly ripped up. Social rents were cut and capped with little notice, borrowing rates for councils were increased overnight, and councils had to sell more homes with bigger discounts following Right to Buy reforms. Top it all off with a pandemic, geopolitical turmoil and rising inflation and interest rates, and the unsurprising result is that most HRAs are in poor financial health. A 2024 report from Savills and the Chartered Institute for Housing suggested that debt cancellation of £17bn would be needed to make HRA borrowing sustainable across the board. This means many council landlords cannot invest in homes in the ways communities need.

Accounting for council housing

In the UK’s national accounts, all HRAs are consolidated and treated as a single ‘non-financial public corporation’. This means they count towards public debt for the purposes of the UK’s fiscal rules. Fiscal rules are the Government’s self-imposed limits on how much it can borrow, spend and accumulate debt. They are designed to reassure financial markets that the public finances will remain sustainable and so keep the Government’s borrowing costs lower.

Before the 2024 autumn budget, the UK used Public Sector Net Debt (PSND) for our fiscal rules. Council housing performed particularly poorly under this measure. Borrowing to finance public investment – including in council housing – increased the headline debt figure, even if the Government acquired valuable assets in return.

The current Government switched from PSND to Public Sector Net Financial Liabilities (PSNFL). The new rules still count debt the Government owns, but they also count financial assets the Government owns – though not physical assets like homes.

This is where things get interesting for council housing.

By far the largest source of borrowing for council housing is from the Public Works Loan Board (PWLB): effectively, councils borrow money from the Treasury, which raises the money by selling gilts on the international markets. When the Treasury lends to council landlords in this way, under PSNFL it actually creates an asset for the public sector: the money councils owe to HMT.

The result is that investing in council housing is a lot easier than it used to be. Let’s say the Treasury agrees to ‘forgive’ £100 million of unsustainable HRA debt to give councils some breathing room, and councils then take out £100 million of new PWLB loans.

Under the old debt rules, this would have looked like the Government simply taking on more debt. Under the new PSNFL rules, it is treated more like cancelling an old loan and then making a new one. The council owes the Treasury £100 million, but the Treasury also owns a £100 million loan. That new loan is recognised as a public financial asset and is largely netted off public debt.

So there’s no reason not to invest in council housing?

Not quite.

New PWLB borrowing for council housing still increases the size of the Government’s balance sheet and the amount of money the Treasury has to raise from investors to finance the new PWLB loans: HMT has to borrow to on-lend to councils. It is unclear how markets would react to a large-scale increase in investment for council housing using the current model. That depends partly on the scale of new PWLB lending, but above all on investor expectations of the UK’s wider fiscal position.

There’s another problem for council housing. While PSNFL makes investing in council homes easier, it also makes other models of delivering social housing even more fiscally attractive. In February 2026, the Government announced a £2.5 billion scheme to provide loans to Housing Associations at 0.1% for 25 years. Incidentally, that’s a much better deal than councils are getting from the Public Works Loan Board at the moment!

Under PSNFL, these loans to HAs are ‘financial transactions’ because the Government acquires a financial asset (a loan) in exchange for cash. But unlike councils, when HAs take out loans from the Government it does not create a liability for the public sector, because their borrowing is ‘off balance sheet’.

If you can deliver the same kinds of homes using private borrowing via HAs, you may get the same policy results with less public sector borrowing and less gross balance sheet expansion. That should make it easier to maintain investor confidence and help keep the Government’s borrowing costs lower. And that may actually be key to increasing investment in social housing: if the UK can borrow more cheaply, we have more space to increase the size of funds like the Social and Affordable Homes Programme. That’s essential to unlocking more social housing supply.

Can we afford not to invest in council housing?

It’s complicated and there are no easy answers. But alongside asking if we can afford to build council homes, we also need to ask if we can afford not to. The clearest fiscal argument here concerns the high costs managing homelessness.

Councils in England now spend £7.7 million every day to put people up in expensive – often sub-standard – Temporary Accommodation. HAs play a vital role in tackling homelessness, but the buck for homelessness ultimately stops with councils. No one else is incentivised to act the way councils are. Getting councils off the bench and delivering homes may be the only way England stops managing homelessness and starts preventing it.

Would you like to write for Red Brick? Email rose.grayston@gmail.com to pitch your piece (c.600-900 words)