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Reforming Section 106 is crucial for a generational boost in social housing

The Section 106 (S106) planning obligation system has long been the backbone of affordable housing delivery across England. Yet, far from being the robust solution we need, it has morphed into an inadequate sticking plaster, barely concealing a profound crisis in genuinely affordable, social rented housing. The more reliant we have become on S106 agreements, the fewer homes we’ve actually delivered. It’s high time we confronted the reality: our dependence on developer-led contributions is fundamentally failing to deliver the homes communities desperately need.

First conceived in the 1990 Town and Country Planning Act, S106 was originally intended to mitigate the localised impacts of new developments—addressing pressures on local infrastructure like schools, healthcare, and transport. Generally, there are two ways to fund social and affordable housebuilding: through government spending via grants or loans, or through developers’ contributions. However, over time, as state-backed social housing provision shrank dramatically, S106 evolved far beyond its initial scope, becoming a primary vehicle for affordable housing supply. Today, it accounts for a staggering 38% of social homes and half of all affordable homes delivered annually. But instead of a sign of success, this reliance reveals a deeply flawed approach.

The current mechanism incentivises developers to prioritise ambiguous and often less suitable housing tenures such as shared ownership or ‘affordable rent’—both considerably less beneficial than genuinely affordable social rented homes. Worse yet, developers frequently opt out of construction obligations altogether, preferring financial payments to already overburdened local authorities with little capacity to use this funding to build. Indeed, while the government’s recent pledge to recruit an extra 300 local planning officers is a positive step, it falls significantly short, replacing fewer than one in ten of the planning positions cut throughout the 2010s. This leaves local authorities severely under-resourced to effectively manage and enforce S106 obligations.The result is clear: fewer actual homes and a deepening crisis.

The viability assessment process, designed to test whether developers can meet planning obligations without compromising profits, has further exacerbated the problem. Despite high-profile cases—like the infamous Battersea Power Station development—raising awareness of exploitation, the truth is that these viability assessments routinely undermine local authorities. Too often, developers reduce or even eliminate their affordable housing commitments entirely by claiming financial unfeasibility. This opaque and subjective process means fewer social homes are built, and crucial opportunities for alleviating housing pressures are lost, often permanently.

Ironically, the reliance on S106 has only deepened since government funding for social housebuilding was drastically cut post-2010. With austerity measures stripping away substantial grant-funding streams, we increasingly looked to developers’ contributions as a makeshift replacement. But the numbers don’t lie. While government targets aim for 300,000 new homes annually, just 7,500 social homes were built in England in 2022/23, down alarmingly from nearly 40,000 a decade ago. Even more starkly, Right to Buy alone axed more than 14,000 social homes out of circulation in the same period, meaning we have had a net loss in social housing stock. Clearly, our existing approach is broken, underlined by the fact that the more we’ve depended on developer contributions, the fewer genuinely affordable homes we’ve managed to produce.

But diagnosing the problem is just the first step. We must urgently pursue substantial reforms to the S106 framework, starting by prioritising the construction of genuinely affordable social rented homes within all agreements. Introducing a mandatory minimum percentage of 15% for social rent tenures within S106 obligations would directly counter developers’ preference for less socially beneficial tenures or financial opt-outs. This simple measure would clarify obligations, remove ambiguity, and most importantly, deliver the genuinely affordable homes that communities across the country desperately need.

Additionally, we must reform the viability assessment process fundamentally. Transparency must become mandatory, and local authorities need enhanced powers and resources to scrutinise developers’ claims effectively. A revised, robust viability framework would prevent abuse, accelerate negotiations, and ensure that developments truly contribute to local housing needs rather than merely inflating developers’ bottom lines.

These immediate reforms are essential but insufficient on their own. Ultimately, the underlying crisis in social housing demands a significant increase in direct government investment. We must look to the next phase of the Affordable Homes Programme, as well as the new £2bn boost, as an opportunity to refocus explicitly on social rented housing. A clear national target backed by meaningful public investment could not only reduce reliance on developers but would restore the stability and predictability required to deliver social housing at scale.

The stakes could hardly be higher. Without these reforms, the government’s ambitious housing targets will remain forever out of reach, and our housing crisis will only deepen. The reliance on a failing S106 system is simply unsustainable. It’s time we embraced a more ambitious, government-backed strategy for social housing delivery—a strategy that prioritises homes over profits, transparency over obfuscation, and genuine affordability over sticking plasters. Only then can we build the future our communities truly deserve.

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Capital funding can keep the economy moving

A Brief History of Time

Housing affordability, or more precisely the lack of it, has been the perennial policy issue of the past decade. Successive Governments have appreciated the scale of the problem, if not the effectiveness of the tools with which they have chosen to address them.

Subsequently, a seemingly endless slew of schemes, initiatives, and re-heated ideas (and no small amount of funding) have been thrown at the task at hand, but with very mixed results. The consequences for those on the periphery of society have been nothing short of catastrophic.

Looming Threats

The past 40 years has seen the state very deliberately reduced the role of public bodies in the direct provision of housing, see Municipal Dreams by John Broughton for an excellent overview of this sorry state of affairs. Councils, once a leading provider of new housing, have been removed from the picture almost entirely.

Housing Associations, now the state’s preferred deliverer of social housing, have never been able to match the numbers of their Local Government counterparts. Whilst a move to a ‘property owning democracy’ has seen the deliberate failure to replace housing sold via Right To Buy, decimate social housing stock levels.

The National Housing Federation (NHF) estimates an additional 350,000 homes per year are required until 2031, with 145,000 of those each year needing to be an Affordable housing product (NHF 2020).

For context with the 241,000 homes completed in 2018-19, was a 30 year high. In short, both Government and the Market have failed to produce the housing we need as a country.

Consequently, and perhaps somewhat bizarrely, England becoming increasingly reliant on the market to deliver social housing. Just over 40% of all social and affordable housing units were delivered via Section 106 (S106) obligations in the period 2015/16 – 2018/19 (MHCLG, 2020 Live Table 1000S). This is manageable in a rising housing market, but as we head towards a sharp economic downturn, it is unlikely to remain the case.

Putting it bluntly, developers do not develop when the we are in a recession, well at least nowhere near as much. So, whilst there will be a certain amount of ‘flow through’ for S106 agreements from developments already in motion, we are likely to see a drop in social housing being delivered through this part of our planning system.

More problematic is this Government’s choice of direction on housing policy means we’re likely to see even fewer social rent units being delivered. Its flagship policy, the First Homes initiative, will heavily rely on S106 contributions as a delivery mechanism (MHCLG 2020) thus the (already low) output of submarket rented homes will reduce further.

The sums involved are not insignificant. NHF estimates increases in current grant provision, to the tune of £1bn per year (NHF 2020), would be required to mitigate the loss of sub-market rented homes from S106 due to the rebirth of this aborted Starter Homes programme.

Required Approaches, History Repeating

So, what can reasonably be done? During the Covid19 crisis we have seen some extraordinary, justified, Government interventions. It is necessary to extend such moves further into the housing market. Housing is by one of the key policy areas where Government can drive counter cyclical measures.

By providing capital funding at a time when many developers will be scaling back production, we can keep elements of the economy moving. It is estimated that for every £1 spent on construction, output stimulates £2.84 in Gross Domestic Product (Capital Economics 2019) and thus for a Government, this is money well spent.

Over the long term the figures are significant.

In its report for the LGA (and others), Building New Homes – an updated economic appraisal, Capital Economics estimates that up to £320bn could be generated through increased economic activity (LGA 2020).

Elsewhere, as and when developers get into trouble during the market downturn, going back to the future may provide the way forward. The National Housing Clearing Scheme successfully saw the Housing Corporation (as was) provide £350million for the purchase of 9,600 homes following the 2007/08 crisis (Hansard 2009).

It enabled the addition of stock into the social rented sector, whilst enabling developers struggling to shift completed units off their books. Indeed it’s been one of the key recommendations from the Commons Select Committee for Communities and Local Government Interim Report on protecting rough sleepers and renters (CSCCLG 2020) and a reboot of the scheme should be a serious consideration.

Combating housing inequality needs public funding

For decades with have held back some of the most effective tools to combating housing inequality and market dysfunction in the UK. Sustained and expansive, publicly funding, housing development.

It is no coincidence that the greatest number of homes were built when Local Government was enabled to directly provide public housing. This needs to be revisited in earnest otherwise we are doomed to repeat the errors of the previous decades.

<strong><span class="has-inline-color has-accent-color">Neil Goodrich</span></strong>
Neil Goodrich

Neil Goodrich has been in the in social housing sector for just over a decade. A Chartered Member of the Chartered Institute of Housing (CIH) and Former Chair of CIH Futures.

He currently works as a Business Insight Manager for Orbit, a Housing Association that operates in the Midlands, East Anglia, South and South East.